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Although early man was not the hardiest of organisms or the 
strongest of body among living creatures, mental advantages gave him 
the upper hand in an evolutionary development that was exceedingly 
ii 
rapid. In our own day, among all the creatures on earth, it is given 
to man alone t o contemplate the panorama of nature with some apprecia-
tion for the magnificance o f its detail and historical scope. From 
this pinnacle only man may question the steps and relationships that 
led from the beginning to his own time. 
Parse g ian (1973, p. 229) 
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The feasibility of a computer-based library reference interview 
is forecasted through an analysis of the literature concerned with 
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primary aspects of the library reference interview, concept formation, 
computer concept formation, computerization of reference service and 
the future of reference service. The state of the art is discussed 
in light of specific computer programs currently available for the 
automation of library reference service. Factors supporting and 
limiting the automation of library reference service are presented . 
Conclusions and recommendations are made for the realization of a 




Origin and nature of the problem 
The equipment required to automate reference work was available 
to libraries lon g before anyone tried to implement it. Schultz (1964) 
indicates that experimentation with library automation began in the 
1940's, pointing out to some extent that a need for automated reference 
service was not apparent prior to World War II. The exponential growth 
of information occurring after World War II caused th e reference 
librarian to become progressively more aware of the inadequ acy of 
traditional tools for retrieving information (i.e., indexes, catalogs, 
bibliographies, a n d abstracts) and the i ncr easing tim e factor involved 
in a literature search. Stevens (1965) suggests that a re cognition of 
inadequacies within manual information retrieval systems has prompted 
consideration of the feasibility of using computers to assist in the 
information retrieval process. 
Thus far the role of the computer has chiefly been that of an 
indexing instrument; whether or not it can fully assume the task of 
information retrieval in a traditional reference situation is still in 
doubt. A computer-based library reference system, like the manual 
system, involves a search strategy. A reference librarian knows how to 
sep a rate the relevant from the irrelevant in the reference interview 
through a complex communication process involving "thinking." Schultz 
(1964) elaborates on this point by implying that in the human procedure, 
then, there are many uncertainties and many decisions to make in 
answering even a simple reference question and that these all become 
important when the procedure is computerized. 
2 
Quite simply, the problem is whether or not a computer can conduct 
an adequate reference int e rview. The questions which arise in dis-
cussing this problem are: 
1. Does a computer have the capacity to be programmed to simulate 
the dynamic cognitive processes involved in human concept formation and 
communication. 
a. Does a computer have the capabili ty to find out what an 
icquirer wants to know when the inquirer cannot describe 
his need precisely? 
b. Does a computer have the ca pa bility to determine the 
objective or the motivati on o f the inquirer to qualify 
the subject of th e inquir y? 
c. Does a computer have the capability to delimit the 
subject of the inquiry? 
d. Does a computer have the capability to determine the 
personal background of the inquirer to discover wha t 
questions should and may be asked during the reference 
interview process? 
e. Does a computer have the capability to determine the 
inquirer's ac ceptability of an answer? 
f. Will an information specialist be required as a communi-
cation interface between the inquirer and the computer? 
2. To what extent will the biases and personality of the computer 
progr ammer affect the adequacy of a computer-based librar y reference 
interview? 
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3. To what extent will the capacity of a computer to store biblio-
graphical information have influence on the capability of a computer to 
conduct an adequate reference int e rview, stor age and retrieval requir-
ing t wo or more separate but interdependent programs? 
4. Does a computer have the capability to repro gr am itself in a 
self-adaptive way to interpret and restructure the inquiry so it fits 
the files as they are organized in a particular library, to include not 
only ca t alog s, indexes, abstracts and other standard files but also a 
"who knows what" file? 
5. Does a computer have the capabilicy to educate the inquirer 
in the use of ref erence mat er ials? 
6. To what extent is it feasible to enter the contents of indexes, 
catalogs, bi bliographies , abstracts and other traditional reference 
to ols into a computer -based library ref e r e nce se rvice? 
7. What are th e cost factors involved in the implementation of a 
computer-ba s e d library refer ence interview system? 
The future of information retrieval includes the elimination of 
manual library reference systems presently in use and the adoption of 
some fo r m of automated reference s ys tem. Hallworth (1969 ) says the 
simulation of human cognitive proce sses by means of computer programs 
h as a very brief history, but it seems certain that in the future there 
will be a close association between theories of human behavior and 
attempts to incr ea se the intellectual capacity of machines. The 
si g nificance of this study rests in its attempt to research the intel-
lectual capacity of computers to determine their potential to make 
information more efficiently attainable to the inquirer than the out-
moded, t raditional manual system presently in use. 
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CHAPTER II 
LIBRARY REFERENCE SERVICE 
Some historical notes 
Shera (1972) introduces the idea that the founding fathers of 
5 
the public library movement in the United States saw the library as an 
institution for enlightening the citizenry, and thereby givin g them a 
greater capability of makin g wise decisions in the votin g booth. No 
doubt the founding fathers of the public library movement in the United 
St a tes saw the librar y as also a place to promote scholarship, inven-
tion and the Christi a n ethic. 
The years from 1840 to 1860 were significant years for libraries 
in the United States. So c i e ty was experi e ncing an awakenin g of 
intell e ctual activity in th e arts, liter a tur e , scholarship, and the 
sciences. Lind e rman (19 67) feels this awa kening stimulated r e ading, 
causing librarians to turn their attention to the invention of 
reference aids. Over the hundreds of years that separated the ancient 
library at Alexandria from the libraries of the 1840's librarians had 
been merely custodians, collectors, and catalogers. The fun c tion of 
use had now been a dd e d to their coll e ctions. Crowley (1971, p. 6) summa-
rizes this viewpoint when he states: 
More than a custodian, the librarian of the late 1800's 
began to formulate a concept of the profession which emphasized 
the utility of the library collection, and the ability and duty 
of the librarian to facilitate that use. 
Librarians have always assisted patrons in the location of 
information . Linderman (1967) points out that perhaps the first 
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important new type of reference tool was Charles Coffin Jewett's use 
of specific subject entries in the construction of a subject index to 
the catalog of the Brown University Librar y . Jewett's subject index 
was published in 1843. 
Linderman (1967) cites 1884 as the year when the profession of 
reference librarian was born. During that year Dewey appointed two 
full-time reference assistants to the Columbia University Library 
Refer e nc e Room . Linderman (1967) names George Baker and William G. 
Baker as "the heroic pioneers of reference librianship." Crowley 
(1971, p. 7) summa rizes Linderman's historical narrative of librar y 
reference service: 
Librarians began, during the 1880's, to provide an addi-
tional service which consisted of answering questions, locating 
facts, and directing patrons to bo oks that could be consulted in 
answering inquiries. This service, which acquired the name of 
"r eferen ce work," was disti nct from person a l assistance to read e rs 
in that the former was co ncerned with the suppl yi n g of information 
and sources of information, and the latter with helpin g patrons 
locate a nd select books. 
Schiller (1 965 ) gives us a t ypical rea ction to the concept of 
"refer ence service" in the 1880's. She tells us that the Examining 
Committee of the Boston Public Library upon suggesting in 1887 there 
should be in Bates Hall a "person whose sole duty it would be to 
answer questions of all sorts, and to direct inquirers in their search 
for information, received the stiff reply from the Trustees that it was 
hardly practicable in that it would require the transfer of personnel 
from other work." The information Schiller has provided allows us to 
conclude that reference service represents a relatively new dimension 
in librarianship. Its establishment is in fact the product of a more or 
7 
less deliberate decision. As a result of this decision to establish 
reference servi ce as a re gular part of the American library system, the 
library p rofession began to de a l in knowled ge beyond dealing with just 
volu mes. 
A characteristic of the American library system since the end of 
the nineteenth century has been personal reference service to the pat-
ron. Personal reference service to the patron has conventionally 
comprised two factors: information and instruction . The ALA Glossarv 
in 1943 defined reference work as "that phase of library work which is 
directl y concerned with assistance to readers in securing information 
and in using the resources of the library in study and research." 
Schiller (196 5 ) points out that in 1961, the ALA Standards Committe e 
dev e lop ed a statement on the content of re fere nce services of f ered t o 
library patrons . Dire c t reference ser vi ce, which "consists of personnal 
assistan ce provided to libr a ry patrons in pursuit of information" was 
cate go rized as instruction a nd infor matio n service. Th e central 
fe a ture of instruction "is to provide guid a nce and direction in the 
pursuit of information, rather than providing the infor mation itself." 
The central feature of information service "is to provide an end prod-
uct in terms of information sought by the library 's patron." Schiller 
(1965, p. 12) concludes that the definition of reference is in sum , 
"instruction in th e use of books and libraries; guidance in the choice 
of books, and information service. " 
Referenc e se rvic e 
Katz (1969, p. 35) vie ws reference service as consisting of two 
distinct types of services which he calls "direct" and "indirect." 
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Direct reference service is a person-to-person relationship usually one 
in which the librarian answers a patron's qu estio n. The second con-
sists of techni cal processing activities and will not be emphasized in 
this discussion. Katz (1969, p. 35) cites the Amer i can Library 
Association, Reference Services Division, "Referenc e Standards," as 
giving the clearest definition of direct re fere nce service. 
Direct reference service consists of personal assistance 
provide d to library patrons in pursuit of information. Direct 
r eference service may take one o f many forms, each of which ma y 
consist of a number of activities, of which only the most 
fr equent and repr ese ntative a re cited bel ow: 
a. Instruction in the use of the library and in the use of items 
in the library's collec tion. This service may range from 
demonstration of how to fill out a call slip to explana -
ti on of the use of catalogs, bibliographies, and reference 
works, to assistance in interpreting the contents of 
materials in the library's colle c tions. The central 
feature of this instruction, irrespective of its level 
or its intens ity , is to provide guidance and direc tion 
in the pursuit of information, rather than the information 
itself. 
b. Information service. This se rvice may range from 
answering an apparently simple question throu gh recour se 
to an obvious reference source to supplying information 
based on search in the collections of the library, com-
bining competence in bibliothecal techniques with compe -
tence in th e subject of inquiry. The character a nd extent 
of library information service will vary with the kind of 
library, with th e patron th e library is desi gned to serve, 
and with the sk ill , compete nce, and professional traini ng 
of the reference librarian providing the information se r-
vi ce. Characteristic functions of information service are 
finding specific data or facts, interpreting the material 
or information found, translating, abstracting, literatur e 
searching, and others. The central feature of information 
service, irrespective of its level or its intensity, is to 
provide an end produ c t in terms of information sought by 
the library's patron. 
The reference question 
Katz (1969) points out that the reference question is the essence 
of reference service. He justifies this viewpoint by implyin g that 
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the success of reference work can be measured by the proper answer. 
Katz (1969, pp. 37-41) recognizes that questions may take as many forms 
as answers but can be divided as follows: 
Directional 
This presupposes that the patron knows or thinks he knows 
precisely what he wants. He only requires directions to find 
the answer. 
The term "directional qu es tion" is often employed to refer 
to bibliographical queries, that is, those which do not answer 
the question directly but "direct" the read e r to a source. For 
example, the question, "What do you have on Albert Einstein?" 
is a directional type in that the librarian may first look up 
references in a source such as a bibliography, a card catalog, or 
an index. The index or catalog then "directs" the user to the 
needed informati on. 
Ready reference 
This presupposes that the patron wants to know an answer 
that will be short and readily available in one or two sources. 
Questions are termed ready reference t hat are readily answered 
with ou t undue research or, often, without much reflection . 
.. . The ready reference, or quick-fact question represents 
by far the most common type of question asked in libraries, 
particularly in public libraries. Estimates vary, but surveys 
indicate th a t this type of question makes up from 85 to 95 percent 
of all those asked. They a re usually answered in on e to eight 
minutes, and 75 percent of them can be normally answered from 
current reference materials. 
Spe cific search 
This presupposes that the patron needs more than one or two 
simple facts to answer a question. He may be seeking a limite d 
amount of information on a subject, probably for a paper, a talk, 
or a program; how-to-do-it material for putting up a fence or 
for filling out his income tax return: or so-called "supporting" 
evidence for a position he has taken about some issue. 
Unlike the ready-reference query, it may involve a consider-
able amount of jud g ement and a recognition of relationships 
between things, persons, or events. For example, consider this 
supporting-evidence type of question: "Was the failure of 
Napoleon's Russian campaign due to his bad luck or his short-
comings as a general?" The reference librarian might go to a 
standard life of Napoleon, a history of Russia, or possibly a 
discussion of various battles. Even then, the answer would simply 
be a cumulation of probabilities. 
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Research 
This pr esupposes that the patron has the type of query that 
cannot be readily answered in one or two sources, but will 
require many specialized sources. The extent of the search may 
expand the "several" to all forms of materials from periodical 
articles to phonograph records, from books to manuscript mater-
ial. It may also call into play not only the resources of the 
library, but the resources of other libraries, both national and 
international in scope of holdings. 
The obvious problem is that while every request for informa -
tion is, in some sense, either of a directional, ready-reference, 
search, or research type, it may develop into a combination of 
all four. The eternal variable is the patron who really is not 
sure what he wants or needs. The eternal difficulty is that the 
library that attempts to organize itself about the four major 
types of questions must face certain patron variables. 
Most requests may fit into a general class, but, in a very 
real sense, every request is unique. Even if the librarian knew 
what type of questions he had been asked over the past thirty 
years, he still would have no assurance that the next one would 
not be an exception . 
Answering the reference question 
Answering a library reference questi on is rarely a neatly sequen -
tial process following an exact outline. Katz (1969, pp. 56-58) lists 
for us the following steps which could be used to solve a reference 
question, though he states: "Th e librarian may short-circuit them all 
because he has particular knowledge, or even a sixth sense about a 
given question, which leads him to a direct answer ." 
1. Specific reference sources 
Here the question is asked, and sometimes, almost a t the 
subconscious level, the librarian knows precisely which reference 
source will give the best answer. Th e important conditions for 
proper use of specific reference sources are: 
a. A thorough knowledge of the reference collection, 
and the ability to rem ember the purpose of specific tools. 
Usually the mnemonic device is simply seeing it on the shelf, 
or recalling that it proved useful in a similar situation 
the day or week or month be fo r e . 
b. Once the specific work is selected for consultation, the 
librari a n must have the abili t y to find the answer quickly 
and eff iciently. This pr esupposes knowledge of the reference 
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work, but more important the ability to scan a table of con-
tents, an index, or, in the case of a complicated work, the 
introduction that explains its uses and limitations. 
2. The general collection 
In using total library sources, the librarian immediately 
considers the subject approach . Usually this is in terms of which 
source to use and the various avenues offered to that subject within 
the specific work. 
a. Success here depends upon a thorough knowledge of 
library system classifications from cross references in cata-
logs and indexes to how the material is stored or shelved. The 
librarian may realize that the query, for example, has to do 
with the history of printing in Montana but be unable to make 
the associatio n between the subject and the likely subject 
heading in the catalog, or where the material might be on the 
shelf--under Montana history, technology, graphic arts, etc. 
b. The reference librarian must be able to move comfortably 
from the general subject to the specific subject. This pre-
supposes a thorough knowledge of close subject classification. 
c. The librarian must have the imagination to move about in 
rel ated subject areas . For example, if he is unable to find 
anything about the history of printing in Montana under the 
subject Printin g , he should then move without question to the 
broader area of Montana history or genera l works on printing 
history of the United States. He must also know, if the 
material is not available in his library, what bibliographies 
and union lists to consult in order to obtain it from another 
library, or, at best, be able to advise the user what biblio-
graphic sources to consider in larger libraries. 
d. A thorough knowledge of the general collection is pre-
supposed here, primarily because the query may be answered not 
in the usual sources, but from a standard bibliography, his-
tory, or manual in the circulating collection. 
3. Classification by type of material 
Here the most obvious type of classification is usually 
in terms of a simple question: "Is the answer most likely to be 
found in a book, a pamphlet, a periodical or a government docu-
ment?" 
a. The decision here is usually based on the kind of infor-
mation sought in terms of depth and timelessness and the 
sophistication of the user. 
b. Another decision is based on knowl edge of the collection, 
or how easy it is to obtain materials from another library. 
For example, a library may have a good pamphlet collection, 
but the librarian who has not often used the collection may 
fail to consider it when a particular question is asked. 
Also, the librarian who realizes that technical materials on 
a given subject are well covered in a library a mile or so 
away has the advantage of being able to simply go to the 
phone for an answer, or to refer the user to the other 
library. 
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We can conclude from the foregoing that the librarian involved in 
reference service must exercise a considerable degree of judgement, 
evaluation, and imaginative skill. She must be able to associate con-
cepts and like ideas from an approach that could take any conceivable 
direction. It is a challenge that requires intellectual activity at 
numerous levels of tho ught. 
Katz (1969) feels that librarians fail to answer reference 
questions for a number of reasons. One reason is a lack of communica-
ti on . If the librarian or the patron fail to express themselves in 
und ers tandable terms, it is impossible to determine the exact informa-
tion the patron is seeking. If a librarian fails to give sufficient 
time to a query, a reference question can aga in remain unanswered. 
Often a libr arian will not go beyond the immediate reference collection 
bec a use she is too busy or simply because she is lazy. Katz (1969) 
points out that many failures to a rrive at an adequate answer to a 
ref erence question are due to the reluctance or the inability of the 
patron to evaluate the service he receives. The librarian, conse-
qu ently , has no check or feedback to encourage her to improve the 
quality of service. Katz (1969, p. 44) cites Gertrude Stein and 
Willi a m James as having summed up the two principal aspects of the 
reference interview: 
Gertrude Stein's final words were: "What is the answer?" 
She he si tat ed a moment, and then wisely countered with "What was 
the question?" In a word, the problem of communication between 
the re ference librarian and the patron is not so much one of 
answers as of questi ons . 
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Katz (1969) divides the reference interview into two parts. The 
first part is concerned with communication between the patron and the 
librarian. The second part is the search strategy, or where a likely 
answer is to be found. This phase of the reference interview deals with 
indivi dua ls rather than information sources. Katz (1969) points out 
that there is one aspect of the personal interview which is not easily 
cate go rized. He refers to this aspect of the personal interview as an 
"i maginative guess that no more than 35 percent of the meaning in a 
face-to-face communication is carried by the verbal message." Katz 
goes on to explain that the physical gestures a patron makes could tell 
the perceptive ref e rence librarian more abo ut the needs of a patron 
th an any spoken word. The utilization of such data has infinite value 
for the r eference interview. 
Kilgour (1972), a proponent of librar y automation, has formed the 
opinion that patrons obtain from libraries only about ha lf the items 
th ey want. He also feels that finding information in research libraries 
has be come so difficult that even library staff members are seriously 
handicapped in their attempt to locat e entries in working files 
arranged in a traditional catalog order. Moreover, creative thinki ng 
is facilitated by rapid transfer of inform a tion from library sources 
to the internal memory, the mind often being distracted by delays in 
this transfer. The primary objective of librarians, therefore, is the 
development of reference search techniques for extremely rapid and 
accurate transfer of information from library sources to the patron 
when and where he needs that information. Linderman (1967, p. 131) 
sugg e sts that "we desperately need more librarians who are willing to 
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learn programming (or better still devise their own library/reference/ 
cataloging-oriented compiler language) and librarians who will assist 
publishers in creating the tools they need in a way which will permit 
more effective and efficient reference service." Linderman (1967, 
p. 64) concludes: 
A g reat need for research is apparent, and unless this is 
undertaken, little more knowledge concerning the reference process 
will exist in ten year's time than is available at present. It is 
depressing to consider that insight into the factors involved in 
provi ding reference service has remained relatively static for 
more than thirty years . It is becoming increasingly apparen t that 
the beh av ioral sciences have much to offer to librarianship by 
way of insight and research methodology, and since man y of the 
problems underlying reference wor k are psycholo gica l, some fruit-
ful res ea rch mi ght be undertaken. 
Summary 
Linderman (1967) tells us that th e profession of reference 
libr aria n was born in the year 1884. Near ly a century passed, how-
ever, until a definition of reference service appeared in the ALA 
Glossary. In 1943 the ALA Glossary defined reference service as "that 
phase of library work which is directly concerned with assistance to 
readers in securing information a nd in using the resources of the 
library to study and research." 
Katz (1969) feels that we can picture reference work as consisting 
of two distinct types of services which can be called "dir ect " service 
and "indire c t" service. This study will be concerned with direct 
reference service rather than indirect reference service. Direct 
reference service is a person-to-person relationship with a patron in 
which the librarian answers a patron's question. 
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Answering a library ref erence question is rarely a ne a tl y sequen-
tial process. The librarian involved in reference service must 
exercise a considerable degree of jud gement, evaluation, and imagina-
tive skill. 
The refer ence inter view arises from dire ct reference service. 
Katz ( 19 6 9) divides the ref e rence interview into two parts: (1) com-
munication between the patron and the librarian, and (2) the search 
st rategy. 
Kilgour (1972) feels that finding information in research libraries 
has become so difficult even library staff members are seriously handi-
capped by working files arranged in a traditional catalog order. We 
can conclude that a prim ary obj ective of librarians should be the devel-
opment of reference search t ec hniques for e xtremely rapid and accurate 
trans fer of inform a tion from library sources to the patron when and 




Definition of concept 
A concept can be perceived as a category of things. In most 
ins tances the se so-called things have a real existence in the e nviron-
men t of an organism. We refer to thes e things as stimuli or stimulus 
objects. Bourne (1966, p. 1) gives us a working definition of the 
term "concept": 
... we may say th a t a co nce p t exists whenever two or more 
distin guis hable objects o r events have been grouped or classified 
to ge ther a nd set apart from o ther objects on the basis of some 
common feature or property char a ct e ristic of each. 
Concepts exis t to simp li fy to some degree the environment of a n 
organis m. If an organism were t o use i ts full capaci t y to distin gu ish 
between stimulus objects, it would soon be overwhelmed by the com-
plexity and unpredictability of its e nviro nment. Cate gorizi n g o r co n-
cept format i on is a necessary way of approaching the tr eme ndous 
diversity an organism encounters in everyday lif e . 
Bourne (1966) points out that concepts are not generated spontane-
ously in an or ga nism. Some learning process has to ta ke plac e before 
the concept exists. Bourne (1966) c on cl ud es that concepts are in this 
sense acquired with effort and attention to specific stimulus objects. 
Some stimuli illustrate a concept and others do not. Bourne 
(1966) refers to those stimuli which illustrate a concept as postive 
instances of the concept a nd those which do not as negative instanc es . 
Hunt (1962, p. 34) points out that •~e can consider concept learning 
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as an example o f decoding, in which positive and negative instances 
transmit information which can be used to reduce the number of hypo th-
eses remaining in the memory bank." 
Bourne (1966) agrees that a conceptual problem exis ts when there 
is a goal or a solution to be learned or d iscovered. He feels that the 
attainment of a solution to a conceptual problem is in most cases a 
process guided by clues the problem solver receives from its enviro n-
ment. He concludes that if the se clues are correctly interpreted, they 
can keep the problem solver on a path toward the correct solution. 
Bourne (1 966) ref e rs to these clues as "information feedback." 
All conceptual problems require an organism to discover and learn 
some type of scheme for grouping stimuli. Bourne (1966) perceives 
this grouping process as an inductive task based on the observation 
of a set of positive and negative stimulus presentations. He continues 
to explai n th at "perc e ptual learning" and "labeling" are two learning 
processes resultin g from stimulus grouping. These two learning pro-
cesses are important to the dis c rimin a tions an organi s m makes among 
stim ulus attributes. 
We may c onclude that perceptual learning involves learnin g to 
detect features of an obj e ct or class of objects which distinguish it 
from others. Labeling is a term employed to describe the process of 
associating particular names or responses with discriminable a ttributes 
or c omplex groupings. Bourne (1966, p. 14) states that "the fact we 
custimarily refer to objects of a certain color as "red" implies a 
prior association between the label "red" and those objects and/or 
similar ones. There is a fair amount of empirical evidence that these 
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distinctive labels add to the discriminability of stimulus objec ts and 
the ir attributes." He concl udes that concept identification occurs 
when an individual discovers and id e ntifies the relevant attrib utes 
among the many that may vary from stimulus to stimulus. 
Learning and utilization 
It would follow, then, that learning is involved both in e nhancing 
the level of discriminability among stimuli and in the process of lab e l-
ing attributes. Learning through a discrimination pro ce ss occurs when 
a conceptual problem requires finer dif fe rentiation among attributes 
or th e acquisition of new labels. Bourne (1966) points out, however, 
that some concep tual problems are be tter described as requiring the 
utilization of previously learned discriminations and labels rather 
th an the learning of new ones. 
Con ceptual rul e s are rules for g r ouping . They specify how the 
re levant attributes are combined for use in classifying stimuli. 
Bou rne (1966, p . 15) t e lls us "it is not clear that every concept 
embodie s a rule. But even in the case of primitive concepts, wherein 
a single attribute provides the basis, there is a rule--eith er the 
attribute is present (positive instance) or absent (ne ga tiv e instance)--
to implement the sorting of stimuli." 
Rules for grouping attr ibut es or stimuli once learned can provide 
an organism with powerful conceptual tools. Bourne (1966, p. 18) 
proceeds to explain that "a repertoire of rules permits rapid acquisi -
tion of unfamiliar stimulus classifications based on it, increases the 
range of concepts that can be formed with any particular stimulus 
population, and enhances the flexibility of the subject's concep tu al 
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behavior, in general.'' The difference between learning and utilization 
is then quite arbitrary. Bourne (1966) views the term "learning" 
as applicable for those tasks wherein the emphasis lies in the acquisi-
tion of some complex behavior strategy whi c h implements a formerly 
unfamiliar rule for grouping. When it is c lear that learnin g has taken 
place and when the task demands some use of that prior learnin g , we use 
the term "utilization." 
The categories of concept formation explained in the fore going 
disc uss ion should be recognized as not mutually exclusive of each 
other. Conceptual behavior to some extent involves perception wherein 
environmental stimulation is received, transformed, and in most cases, 
organized before we respond to it overtly. It is quite clear that 
basic learning processes a re also put t o u se wherein discriminations 
are acquired, ve rbal and other labels are acquired, and learnin g sets 
are acquired. Bourne (1966, p. 21) takes this discussion to a hi gher 
dimension by pointing out that "concept ual behavior impinges on 
thinking and problem solving, for certainly adequate performance in 
conceptual tasks depends on internally organized symbolic activities 
and complex behavioral outputs." 
Mediational stimulus - response theory 
Learning and complex behavior which go on inside an org a nism can 
be explained by the mediational stimulus - response theory. Bourne 
(1966) explains that the mediational S - R theory attempts to describe 
internal symbolic activities which intervene between external stimulus 
and overt response. He is convinced that the rnediational process plays 
an important role in governing overt responses. 
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Concepts are learned through an associational process which links 
two or more stimuli with a common response. The common response in the 
mediational S - R theory is viewed as having an internal as well as 
an external representation. The mediational S - R theor y does not 
assume there exists a direct linkage between physical stimuli and an 
overt act of behavior, but rather assumes there develops a complex or 
at least two-st age chain of co nnecti ons involving internal and external 
stimulus and response events. Bourne (1966) views an external stimula-
tion as initiating in an organism an event called a "pure stimulus 
act." He sees this as an internal response, functioning solely to 
produce additional stimulation which serves as a cue for fu rth er overt 
responding. Figure 1 (Bourne, 1966, p. 31) represents a simple 
behavioral process . Here r is an intern a l "pure stimulus act " brought 
forward by an external stimulus, S. Th e internal pure stimulus act, 
r, in turn generates an internal stimulus, s. We can see that the in-
ternal stimulus, s, then produces overt behavior, R. The cue-producing 
function of r may itself be learned. Bourne (1966) believes this 
theory allows for the entry of prior learning into any new associa-
tional process. 
Bourne (1966, p. 31) describes concept learning as an "acquired 
equivalence for a set of per c eptibly different stimulus patterns. 
Within this theory the process is pictured as the acquisition of a 
common mediating response to the various patterns. This process is 
described in Figure 2. 
We can see from this diagram that conceptual behavior is a 
special mediated chain involvin g multiple converging linka ges between 
external stimuli and an internal response. 
S-------~ r 
\ 
Figure 1. Simple behavioral process. 
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Underwood (1952, p. 211) believes "thinking is a process in which 
th e subject is moti vated to solve a problem - r each a goal - and the 
solution depends upon his learning or recognizing certain relationships 
among symbols, objects, or among relationships themselves." 
Mediators do play an important role in behavior. Bourne (1966, 
p. 32) is conv inced "it is clear that the intern al mechanisms of an 
organism are not 'silent'". He continues: 
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There are internal response mechanisms (muscles, glands, 
nerves) which are continuously active. Further, there are internal 
sensing mechanisms (specialized receptor cells, nerves) which are 
continuously alert to the internal environment just as the excep-
tors (external receptors) are alert to the external environment. 
These activities are integrated complexly wi th the outward, on -
going behavior of an organism, which is probably reason enough to 
represent them in any theoretical account. 
More specifically, mediators play an important role in a learner's 
orientation toward key aspects of the stimuli. Bourne (1966, p. 35) 
states that "prior associations of a given object carry its meaning and 
are represented internally as mediators." Here again he stresses the 
importance of verbal behavior in coding associates of a stimulus: 
Forming concepts often can be seen as a process wherein 
the common meaning of various stimuli (mediators) is linked with 
some (possibly new) overt naming or category response. As a 
concrete example, suppose a subject is given the task of learnin g 
to categorize a series of familiar objects (represented pictorially) 
such as a melon, a head of lettuce, a pork chop and so on, as posi-
tive instan ces and others, such as a house, an automobile, and a 
tree, as negative. This is quite obviously a case where medi a ted 
meaning, based on earlier learning, would play an important function. 
"Food" is a strong association (meaning) of all the positive items; 
the problem is solved once the new response - for example, "p osi-
tive instance," "Category A," or some other label - is conditioned 
to this mediator. 
Bourne (1966) has found that mediators act as building blocks from 
which abstract and/or hierarchically arranged concepts can be formed. 
The most basic concepts are those wherein simple stimulus attributes 
correspond to physical dimensions. Bourne (1966) believes that media-
tional representations of stimulus attribute groupings can be combined 
complexly so as to produce concepts with no physical referents. He 
views these g roupin gs as concepts defined solely in the abstract with 
words. The mediator is in essence the means by which prior learning, 
or memory for previous events, enters into present behavior. 
Associational theories and informa-
tion processing models 
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Two other explanations exist r ega rding the internal learning 
beh av ior of an organism. Bourne (1966, p . 36) briefly outlines these 
expl a nations for us: 
Associational theories picture le arnin g a s a passive, some -
what automatic stampin g-in of conn ec tions between stimulus events 
and responses. In contrast the type of theory we call hypothesis 
testin g views the organism as an "active" learner. He is assumed 
to possess some selectivity. He operates in important ways on his 
environm e nt. First, he may not respond to all available stimulus 
features, but rather select and att en d to only certain aspects 
whi c h, on the basis of a hypothesis, are considered relev a nt. 
Second, the subject decides upon and execut e s a response, in 
conformation with the hypoth esis , which s e rves as a test of its 
adequacy . Typicall y , such a theor y views any possi b le associa-
tional process, say, between critical stimulus features and the 
corr e ct hypothesis (or the responses which imple men t that hypothe -
sis) as trivial. While such associati ons may deve lop , the y are 
merely a by-produ c t o f selection and test routi ne s. Furthermore, 
becaus e of th e na tur e of these routin es , associa ti ons a re pre-
sum e d to deve lop qui ck ly, perhaps on a sin g le tri a l, if the 
hypot hesis can be proved all at onc e . The important learnin g does 
not involve S - R associations but ra th e r the ac quisition of 
knowled ge, reco gni tion, and "underst an din g " of a principle re-
quired by th e task. 
Bourne (1966, p. 42) continues: 
Associ a tional theories visualize concept le a rnin g as a pro-
cess wher e in new linkages are g radually developed, either between 
distin guish a ble features of an external stimulus a nd an overt 
response or, somewhat more complexly, among a chain of stimulus 
and respons e events, some of which are internal to the org a nism. 
Hypothesis-testing theories assert that the linka ges, if there 
are any, either already exist or a re formed instant a neously a nd 
th a t the b a sic probl e m for the subject is discovering which link-
ages (hypothesis) works. The theories seem to be different and yet 
they are not en tirel y incompatible. It may be that an elem e nt of 
truth exists in both and th at each "works" in certain probl ematic 
situations. 
Bourne (1966) introduces inform ation -processin g models of concept-
ual behavior as those models which attribute to the concept learn e r cer-
tain primitive o r basic procedures called information-processing units. 
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He concludes that these information-processing units receive, organize, 
and interpret stimulus and feedback inputs from the environment in 
such a way as to define a conceptual grouping. The objective of such 
information-proc essing models is to include wi thin the framework of any 
particular mod el a minimal repertoire of procedures sufficient for the 
mod el to mimic the behavior of real subjects. Bourne (1966, p. 40) 
gives us a detailed description of an information-processing model: 
The model builds a description of the correct concept in 
the form of a tree of decisions. Each nodal point or decision 
point in the tree considers one re levan t dimension of each suc-
cessive instance, leadin g on to one branch if a certain attribute 
is pres ent in the instance and to the other branch if it is miss-
in g . The complexity of the final tree, that is, the number of 
decision points it contains, depends both on the number of relevant 
dimensions and number of exceptions to the common attributes' 
description of a concept . 
... We shall consider only a few additional points. First 
of all, the model can be realized as a c omputer program so that 
pr e dictions and complex simulations of real data can be produced 
both efficiently and rigorously. Second, this theory is one of 
the few which makes any real attempt to acco unt for the learning 
and utilization of conc e pts based on rules other than conjunction. 
This must be viewed as an important step, for real life concep t s 
of disjunctive, relational, and other varieties are too common to 
be ignored. 
Conjunctive, disjunctive and 
relational rules 
Conjunctive, disjunctive and relational rules employed in the 
learning and utilization of c oncepts are explained by Hunt et al. 
(1966, p. 220) . 
... one can logically distinguish a number of different kinds 
of concepts, derived from the types of classifications of instances 
described by the logical operations "and" and "or." In the 
conjunctive type all of the inst a nces have features in common, so 
the concept is one where each inst ance possesses characteristics 
A and B, and Band C, etc. In the case of disjunctive concepts, 
all instances have one or another feature (cf. Bruner, Goodnow, 
and Austin's (1956) example of the concept "strike" in baseball, 
where a strike is defined as either a pit c hed ball which crosses 
the plate between the batter ' s knees and his shoulders or is 
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alternatively any pitch struck at by the batter which fails to be 
sent into the field). The authors just mentioned found this type 
of concept exceedingly difficult to learn. The third type of con-
cept, discussed most ex tensively by Smok e (1935), is rel a tional, 
in which the common properties are sets of relationships rather 
than c·ommon specific stimulus elements. For example, the concept 
of isosceles triangle involves the common relationship of equality 
between two of the sides, and the positive instances may have 
wi d ely differing size and shape. 
Hunt et al. (1966, p. 224) have discov e red that under their experi -
mental conditions "b oth conjunctive and relational concepts are 
sel ec ted significantly more frequently than disjunctive ones . " Accord-
in gly , they plan to program their initial computer simulations so that 
"conjunctive possibilities are considered alternately with relational 
ones." They feel that "only when both have been explored without suc-
cess will the program of the computer consider possible solutions 
involving disjunctive concepts." Wells (1963, p. 63) gives us one 
explanation for the difficulty of attainin g disjunctive concepts. Of 
disjunctive concepts he says: 
... each of the positive values of such a concept is found in 
some, but not all, of the positive instances. In the case of a 
conjunctive concept, on the other hand, both positive values 
appear in all of the positive instances. Thus the proportion of 
positive instances which contain each positive value is differ-
ent for the t~o types of concepts. 
Bourne (1966) believes that two sources of information are avail-
able to an organism who is learning a concept. Thes e two sources of 
information are the stimulus and the informative feedback. He further 
believes that organisms must perceive correctly the information avail-
able in a stimulus or a feedback signal before they can learn or make 
valid inferences from it. It follows that the major factor controlling 
th e perceptual activities of an organism is its attention to the stirnu-
lus field. Bourne (1966) concludes that behavioral events in v olved in 
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the learning of any conceptual problem can be viewed as a chain which 
begins with an orienting response initiated by some "ready" signal. 
That is to say, the stimulus, as perceived, initiates a mediational or 
symbolic response which serves as a cue to the overt act of categorizing. 
The mediational response, as explained earlier, is essentially an 
abs tra ctio n of certain stimulus attributes. Eventually, when the 
relevant attributes have been abstracted, mediational activities pro-
vide the internal stimulation to which correct category response s are 
associated. 
It was explained earlier that any concept can be described in 
terms of a set of relevant attributes and a rule which combines or 
prescribes the function of or rel atio nship among these attributes. 
Bourne (1966) feels that rule learning may be viewed as a process by 
which an o r ganism acquires information on the assignment of all com-
binations of relevant stimulus attributes to response categories. To 
say , then, that an organism has learned a rule is to say that it 
understands how it uniquely assigns stimulus elements to response 
categories. Bourne (1966) points ou t that efficient concept forma-
tion presumes that an organism was able to achieve an encoding of 
known stimulus attributes into an effective truth table (Haygood and 
Bourne, 1965). They conclude that the distribution of these stimulus 
attributes into categories within the truth table then identifies the 
relevant rule. 
Transfer of learning occurs when prior experience from one situa-
tion influences performance in another situation. Bourne (1966) tells 
us that origin al learning transfers from one situation to another with 
a positive (facilitory), negative (inhibitory), or negligible effect 
depending on the characteristics of the circumstances creating the 
original learning. He believes that one way to evaluate the effec-
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tive ness of a learning experience is to determine the extent to which 
it transfers positively to other situations. 
Sets or cognitive maps 
Bourne (1966) tells us that an organism has preestablished tenden-
cies and expectations called sets while attempting to solve new con -
cept formation problems. He concludes that these sets occur as a 
result of p ast experiences in similar or related situations. It 
follows that because experiences differ among organisms, so do their 
sets. Bourne (1966) points out that sometimes a set is appropriate for 
solving a new concept formation problem, and sometimes it is inappropri-
ate. 
An organi s m acquires response patterns while attaining concepts. 
Response patterns occur as a result of r egularit ies in information 
gathering decisions of an organism. Byers (1963) calls these regular-
ities "strate gies ." 
Tolman (19 48, p. 193) believes that "l ea rning consists not in 
stimulus-response connections but in the building up in the nervous 
system of sets which function like cognitive maps, and second, th a t such 
cognitive maps may be usefully characterized as varying from a narrow 
strip variety to a broader comprehensive variety ." Harlow (1949. 
p. 51) emphasizes that: 
... Our emotional, personal, and intellectual characteristics 
are not the mere algebra i c summation of a near infinity of stimulus -
response bond s . The learning of primary importance t o the primates 
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at least, is the formation of learnin g sets; it is learnin g how 
~ learn efficiently in the situ a tions the a nimal frequently 
encounters. This learning to learn tr an sforms the organism 
from a creature th a t adapts to a changing environment by trial 
and error to one that adapts by seeming hypothesis and insi ght. 
Harlow (1949) concludes that this learnin g to learn, or rath e r 
this tr a nsfer from problem to pr oblem which we call the formation of a 
learnin g set, is a highly predictable and orderly process. He further 
c ontends that the acquisition o f a le a rnin g set changes a concept 
formation problem from an intellectual difficulty into an intellectual 
triviality and leaves the organism free to comtempl at e problems of 
another hi e rarchy of difficulty. 
Bourne (1966) believes that an organism has a memory which pro-
duces responses even though the physi cal stimuli for those responses 
are not present. Further ~o r e , he beli eve s th at an organism brin gs past 
experiences to a situation which allows it to discard one or more 
stimuli as irrelevant. Underwood (1952, p. 212) is convinced that 
"because problem solvers are human does not necessarily mean that they 
would be superior to automation at solvin g problems, for they have 
biases and sets and prejudices which may retard as well as enhance 
solutions." 
Haygood and Bourne (1965) conclude that an organism must have 
lev e l II concepts available as components in order to correctly 
identify an instance of a l eve l III concept. In like manner, to make use 
of level II concepts, an organism must be familiar with level I con-
cepts. We can see from this that an organism must use and therefore 
have attained concepts at a lower level in order to have attained a 
complex concept. This interpre t ation of concep t formation implies 
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that an organism does not lea rn level III concepts as such, but rather 
constructs or induces them from their component parts. 
Neural physiology and concept 
format io n 
Simon and Barenfeld (1969) describe information-processing theories 
of human p rob lem solving, especially those employing computer simulation 
of hu man concept formation, as a selective search through the "tree" of 
soluti on possibilities. The authors of these theories together wi th 
their critics agree that heuristic search is an important part of 
problem-solving behavior but is by no means the whole of it. Further-
more, we can postulate that the processes going on inside an organism 
involving sensory organs, neural tissues, and muscular movements 
controlled by neur a l signals are a l so symbol-manipulating process es ; 
cons e quently, patterns in various encodings can be detected, recorded, 
tra nsmitted, stored, co pi ed, and so on, by the mechanisms of this 
sys tem. Rosenblueth (1970, p. 4 7) categorizes sensory receptors as 
follows : 
... the interceptors, which g ive us information pertaining to 
changes that take place inside our organism, e.g ., the proprio -
ceptors in muscles, tendons, and joints, and the chemoreceptors 
and baroreceptors in the carotid body; the surface receptors in 
the skin and mucosae, such as the tactile receptors and thermo-
receptors; a nd finally, the telereceptors, which give us informa-
tion abou t events that occur at a d ist ance from our bodies. We 
have receptors for only a small number of forms of energy : li gh t, 
in the ret i n a; gr avity and acceleration, in the labyrinth; vibra-
tory, in the ear and i n some skin and bone receptors; heat, in 
th e receptors of the skin and some mucosae; and chemical, in the 
smell and taste receptors of the nose a nd tongue. With regard to 
li gh t and sound waves, the corresp onding receptors are s ensit ive 
to only limited ran ge s of wave len gths . 
Rosen blueth (1970, p. 50) theorizes that "information about the 
material universe collected by the receptors is conveyed to the central 
30 
nervous system through nerve impulses that travel over the afferent 
axons connected to these receptors." He further theor ized that 
"messages are thus in code and the number of ind ependent parameters 
t hat can appear in the code is determined by the properties of the 
axons." 
Arbib (1972, p. 33) gives us a description of the mammalian visual 
system: 
... we see that rod and cone activity, after being pre -
processed by two layers of cells within the retin a, passes up 
the optic tract (the array of axons of the retinal ganglion 
cells) and branches into a number of pathways. Two of these 
lead to midbrain structures, the superior colliculus and the 
pretectum . 
.. . A third destination for the optic tract - and the domi-
nant one in man - lies in the thalamus and is called the lateral 
genticulate nucleus because it is the lateral part of two 
structures bent or angled like a knee (think of genuflection, 
bending of the knee), whe re signals a r e further preprocessed 
enroute to the region at the rear of t he head. This visual 
cortex is somewhat striated (striped) in appearance and so is 
referred to as striate cortex .... This visual cortex is also 
called area 17 because it was the seventeenth area that a man 
named Brodmann put a number on. The optic radiation - the axons 
from the lateral geniculate - also pro j ect s to the surrounding 
prestriate cortex in are a s numbered 18 and 19. In addition to 
a two-way communication between visual cortex a nd superior col-
liculus, there are also pathways from visual cortex to other 
areas of cortex, of which the frontal eye field (involved in 
monitoring of eye movements) and infratemporal (i.e., on the 
underside of the temporal) cortex are actively involved. 
Simon a nd Barenfeld (1969) have organized the "p ercept ual" 
process into a new chess -p erception pr o gr am, PERCEIVER, that can 
sim u late the initial sequences of the eye movements of human subjects. 
Summary 
A co ncept is a category of thin g s; these things are referred t o as 
stimuli or stimulus objects . Bourne (19 66 , p. 1) concludes, "We may 
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say that a concept exists whenever two or more distinguishable objects 
or events have been grouped or classified together and set apart from 
other objects on the basis of some common feature or property c hara cter-
istic of each." 
Concepts exist to simplify to some degree the environment of an 
org a nism. Cate gorizing or concept forma tion is a necessary way of 
approaching t he tremendous diversity a n organism encou nt ers in every -
day life. 
All conceptual problems require an organism to discover and learn 
some type of scheme for grouping stimuli . Bourne (1966) perceives this 
grouping process as an inductive task based on the observation of a 
set of positive and ne gative stimulus pres e ntations. We may conclude 
that perceptual learning involves learning to de tect fea tures of an 
object or class of objects which distin g uish it from others. 
Conceptual rules are rules for g roupin g. They specify how the 
relevant attributes are combined for use in cl a ssifying stimuli. 
Bourne (1966) , p. 18) explains that "a repertoire of rules permits 
rapid acquisition of unfamiliar stimulus classificati ons based on it, 
increas e s the range of concepts that can be formed with any particular 
stimulus population, and enhances the flexibility of th e organism's 
conceptual behavior." 
Bourne (1966) views the term "learnin g" as ap pli cable for those 
tasks wherein the emphasis lies in the ac quisition of some complex 
behavior strategy which implements a formerl y unfamiliar rule for 
g roupin g . When it is clear that learning has taken place and when the 
task demands some use of that prior learnin g , we use the term "utiliza-
tion." 
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Conceptual behavior is a special mediated chain involving multiple 
converging linkages betw een ex ternal stimuli and an internal response. 
Bourne (1966) has fo un d that mediators act as buildin g blocks from 
which abstract and/or hierarchically arranged c oncepts can be formed. 
Any concept can be described in terms of a set of relevant attri-
butes and a rule which combines or prescribes the function of, or rela-
tionship among these attributes . Bourne (1966) te lls us that an 
organism has preestablished tendenci es and expectations called sets 
while attempting to solve new concept formation problems. Harlow (1949) 
concludes that this learning to learn, or rather this transfer from 
problem to problem which we call the formation of a learning set, is a 
highly predictable and orderly process. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPUTER CONCEPT FOR}1ATION 
Computer structure 
Hunt (1962) tells us that a computer is useful in artificial 
intelli g ence res ea r ch because it permits the testin g of a wide range 
of designs for intelligent machines. He f urther contends that a com-
puter can only add and compare numbers - in itself it is in no way 
intelligent. Garvin (1963) believes, however, that a computer can 
make certain types of elementary decisions. He feels that i t cannot 
exercise judgement, but it can determine whether or not selected 
c rit eria apply in a given case and decide what to do next. In perform-
ing the se elementary decisions, a comput e r c hooses from several pre-
specified alternatives . 
The concepts of computer hardware a nd computer software to ge ther 
co~p rise the computer system. Hardware includes the computer machine 
and peripheral equipment such as punching, sorting, listing, or dupli-
eating machines. Software means the programs which communicate with 
the computer . 
Henley (1970, pp. 3-4) describes a computer as a "coll ection of 
machinery or hardware" consisting of th e following four elements: 
... There is the store, or main memory, of the computer, which 
ho lds items of information for as long as they a r e needed. This 
in formation may take the form of instructi ons constituting a pro-
gram to be executed, or data on which that program is to operate. 
Thus, in th e case of a payroll program, the list of employees 
who se pay is to be recorded and the payroll program which carries 
out the actual operati ons would both be held in the computer's 
store. After the program has run to completion, the information 
may be erased from the computer memory as it is no longer 
needed. 
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A second component is the control unit, which examines the 
instructions contained in the program, and sends out the electronic 
signals which instigate the req u ired oper a tions. Thirdly, there 
are the arithmetic and character-handling units, which perform 
the request e d operations on items contained in th e main store. 
Thus, an instruction to add two items together would reside in 
the main memory, be recognized by the control unit, and actually 
e xe cuted by the arithmetic unit. Fourthly, there are a number of 
input/output devices controlled by device control units, by means 
of which information is communicated to and from the main store . 
Instructions c an be issued by the programmer to read from or write 
to those devices. 
The main store, as has been described, contain s items of informa-
tion. Henley (1970) tells us that the programmer sees the store as 
being split into separ a te locations each holding one item of informa-
tion. He de scribes these locations as bein g numbered consecutively 
from zero upwa rds. This nu mber is called the a ddress of the location 
to which it ref e rs. He contends that the s ize of the store det e rmines 
the amount of information th a t can be hel d at one time. A lar ge store 
ha s ov e r 1,000,000 loc a tions. 
Henley (1970, p. 4) e x pl a ins how informat i on app e ars in a computer: 
Within the individual store location, the information appe a rs 
as a pattern consistin g of l's and O's (binary digits or bits as 
th e y are called). Each item of information, such as a decimal 
di g it or a letter of the alphab e t or another significant character 
such as might app e ar on a typewrit e r keyboard, is represented by 
a uniqu e pattern, and there are int e rn a tional standards for coding 
ch a racters. Many modern computers use an 8-bit loc a tion or byte, 
which g ives 256 differ e nt pattern combinations of l's and O's 
availabl e to represent characters. Some patterns have a particu-
lar si gnificance for the hardware, and represent instructions to 
b e obeyed. Thus, if the control unit examines a location con-
taining one of th e se patterns, the effect is to cause the instruc-
tion repres e nted by that pattern to be obeyed. 
Fei genbaum and Feldman (1963) consider the instruction to "comp are 
and transfer control" very important because it enables the computer 
to make a simple two-choice decision - to take one of two specified 
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courses of action depending on the information found in some cell of 
the memory. By cascading these simple decisions, highly complex deci-
sions could be fashioned . Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963, p. 2) further 
state: 
Information processes more complicated than those "wired into" 
the computer can be carried out by means of a sequenc e of the 
elementary instructions, called a program. The program is the 
precise statement of the information process that the user desires 
the machine to carry out. A computer program is stored in the 
memory alo n g with all the other problem information a nd data . 
One part of a program can call in another part of the program 
from the memory to the worki ng stor age and alter it. The ge neral-
purpose digital computer can do any information processin g task 
for which a program can be written. The same computer which one 
moment is computing a company 's payroll may in the next moment be 
computing aircraft designs or insurance premiums. Any program 
for a general purpose compu ter effec ti vely converts this general-
purpose machine into a spe cific pu rpose machine for doing that 
task intended by the user who wrot e the program. 
Hunt (1962) explains that a list of comput e r instructions taken as 
a whole is called a program. Modern com p uters are pro g rammed in a 
language which is more natural for humans. Hunt (1962) contends that 
modern computer lan guages such as ALGOL or FORTRAN are very similar to 
conve ntional algebraic notation. He explains that the user writes his 
program in FORTRAN, ALGOL, o r some other human-oriented language which 
is then a utomatically converted into the sequenc e of digits that will 
actua lly control the computer. Lan guages such as this are called so ur ce 
lan g uages. 
Garvin (196 3 , p. 234) concludes the following: 
... Digital computers are advantageous only when one is going 
to perform the same task over and over again. Then the speed of 
the computer makes its application economical. As an example one 
mi ght g ive the problem of findi ng the sum of a million numbers. 
One wouldn't say, as one might in hand calculations, add the first 
number_!:.£. the second number, add the third number_!:.£. the sum, add 
the fourth number_!:.£. the su m, until one finally said add the one -
millionth number .!_Q the sum. Instead one would do something 
logically more complex and fantastically shorter. The instruc-
tions would be: 
Set the sum .!_Q equal Q. 
Se t l:_ .!_Q e qual .!_. 
Add the ith number to the sum. -- -- -- -- -- --
Does l:_ ~ .!_ million? lf so, ~ are finished. 
lf not, increase l:_ ~ one and proceed through the 
thir d and fo urth instructions. 
J. R. F. Alonso and P. A. G. Alonso (1970, pp. 10-12) present a 
detailed explanation of machine language: 
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What the computer really speaks, machine language, can be 
manipulated almos t d ir ect l y by the computer circuitry. A repre -
sentative hypothetical machine language statement consists of a 
string of numbers preceded by a sign. This string may be divided 
into three parts: the instruction or operation code, the internal 
conventions according to which the instruction is to be executed, 
and the indication of where the datum to be acted upon is located. 
For example, conside r the statement: '+100095247'. The sign and 
first two digits denote an operation code; '+01" stands for 
"stor e " or "locate in a given place." The following four digits 
(0009) denote certain internal compu t e r conventions according to 
which the particular operation should be performed. In this case, 
'ac cording to the value stored in storage location 9.' The last 
four digits (5247) stano for the number of the storage location 
where the particular piece of information is to be stored, or in 
the case of other types of instructions, the particular storage 
location where o r on which the computer is to operate on its numer-
ical contents. Machine language is the logical choice for appli -
cations where computation speed is at a premium. It presents these 
disadvantages: programming in machine language is very difficult; 
th e resulting program is strongly machine dependent, i.e., it may 
not be run in a computer other than for th at for which it was 
written; and the resulting program is quite difficult to under -
s t and for a person other than the the original programmer. 
Assembly language statements look somewhat more like natural 
words th an machine language statements. An assembler, (a special 
program that may be supplied with th e computer) translates assembly 
l anguage statements into machine language. Our hy pothe tical instruc-
tion '+100095247' when written in assembly lan guage would become 
'S T09A ' which, when translated into natural language means 'store 
according to the contents of location 9 thi s information into the 
location corresponding to the vari ab le A.' The pro gramme r need no 
lon ger remember the location number '5247' be cause the computer 
automatically associate s the name 'A' with whatever the contents 
of a location also 'chosen' by the comp uter may be. 'ST' is also 
far easier to remember than '+01'. 'Words' like 'ST' are called 
mnemonics a nd their value beco mes evident when one realizes that 
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there may be a hundred different instructions in a particular 
machine language . It would be sheer masochism to memorize th ese 
hundred different number s instead of easy to understand mnemonics 
whi ch closely resembl e natural language. One lets the ass e mbler 
tr a nslate these mnemonics into machine lan guage. The same reason-
i ng applies to trying to re member location numbers instead of 
lettin g the assembly progr a m de fine a nd r eme mber which location 
number corresponds to the variable or entity th a t the pro g rammer 
chooses to call 'A'. Examples of commonly used assembly languages 
ar e FAP (Fortran Assembly Program) use d by the IBM 7090 Series 
Computers and AUTOCODER used by the IBM 7070 Series Computers. 
User oriented languages do far more for the pro g rammer, 
thereby simpli fy in g the pr ogramm ing process significantly. User 
oriented lan gua ge s may be master e d in a fortnight with a reasonabl e 
e xpenditure of effort by al most anybody with a secondary education. 
A compiler is the special program supplied with the computer th at 
translates user oriented language statements into assembly or 
machine lang ua ge . User oriented la n gua ge s thems e lves are often 
c a ll ed co mpil ers , as f oll ows: Mathematical compilers like 
FORTRAN ( FOkmu la TRANslator) or ALGOL (ALGOrithmic Lan guage) or 
MAD (Mic higan Algorithm Decoder) are desi gned to operate on 
relati ve l y few items of in fo r ma ti on , but to perform man y compli-
cated manipul a tions on them. Compil e r s are also particularly 
suited for the pro g rammin g of algorithms, sequ e n ces of systema-
t ized ope r ation s or logical steps leading toward s th e execu ti on 
of a p a rticular computational task. Business co mpilers like COBOL 
(COmmon Bu si n ess Oriented La n gua ge) are int e nd ed to operate on ma ny 
it ems of information a nd t o perform f ew simpl e operations on the m. 
All p ur pose user oriented languages like PL/1 (Pr ogram min g 
Lan guage 1) can do b oth math emat i ca l a nd business funct i ons with 
equal ease, but the y are still in t he stage of development and 
a re not a s standardized and machine c omp a ti b le as the most com-
mon languages, FORTRAN a nd COBOL . Lo g ical Concatenation 
Lan gua ges operate on contex t-fr ee strings of characters, and 
manipulate them to suit specific p urposes like de termini ng how 
many times the string 'and' was used by Sh akespea re or reclassi-
f y in g the card catalog of a lar ge librar y according to a ne w 
classification s c heme. Commonly used Logical Con cate nation 
Languages are SNOBOL (StriNg Ori ented symBOLic langua ge ), SNAP 
(Stylized NAtural Pro ced ur a l lan guage ), an d LIS P (LISt 
Processing language) . 
Henley (1970) explains that a us e r pro gram cannot issue any of its 
own input or output instructi ons. He s tat e s that it must bran ch into 
a supervisor pro gram and p a ss across details of the information it 
needs and where in store th e informati on is to be read; the supervisor 
pro g ram then issues the instruction on the behalf of the us e r. 
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It is worthwhile at this point to discuss the way in which lar ge 
amounts of in forma tion required in information retri eval systems is 
organiz ed . Each separate collection of information is known as a file. 
Henley (1970) explains that in a library context there would be an 
author file, a title file, and a master file with all the biblio-
graphic inf orma tion about each document. 
Henley (1970, p. 7) states that within a file, each individual 
item is called a record . 
. .. Thus a r eco rd in the above examples would 
author, one title, or the entry fo r one document. 
be ke pt on a storage medium, and a program wishing 
particul a r record in s tore, and it could then, for 
the e n try requir e d, and r e write the new version of 
stora ge again. 
comprise one 
The file would 
to access one 
example , alt e r 
th e file to 
Henley (1970, p. 8) explai ns that a computer ca n process inc r ed i ble 
amounts of infor mation in what by human st J ndards is impossible to 
achieve . 
.. . In addition a mach ine does n o t ge t tired, can repeat 
operations aga in and again without any r ed uction in performance, 
and will not make mistakes. But it requires th a t the inform at ion 
it receives and the programs it executes be completely accurate. 
A system is only as go od as the da ta and the pro g rams used. This 
means that for example in a library situation, the work which might 
under a manual system go into writin g out lists of books, or 
r ec ords cards , has to be channelled into preparing or checkin g 
the files to be re ad into the machine. And whereas a single 
mistake could safely have been ignored, it may now be the cause 
of a c a tastrophic failure of the system. This need fo r complete 
accuracy, and possible ways of surmounting it by programming, is 
one of the important concerns of this work. 
Henley (1970, p. 41) describes a fully op era tional artificial 
intelli ge n ce information retrieval system as ''a library with a set of 
terminals an d di splay unit, some of which are used by library staff for 
accessions etc., and some of which are available to the general public. 
... A number of keys woul d be a vailable at the t erminal , 
and the program would interro ga te the user as to his require-
ments, and hand control to the appropriate routine. Whil e the 
librar ian was adding to the files from one console, the user 
could ask for information from anoth e r. 
Henley (1970, p. 19) feels that the design of such consoles is 
important: 
Ide ally they should comprise a keyboard with a selec-
tion of keys to initiate differ e nt processes, as well a s a 
typ e.writ er keyboard to enter the information. In conjunction 
with this i s need e d a video display unit, and a device such as 
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a light pen e nab l ing the user to point to and alter items dis-
played in t he screen. Each keyboard is connected to the central 
processing unit. In connection with this a full suite of p ro-
grams must be provid e d by the manufacturer which a llow the 
operating s y st em to monitor the various conso l es and initi a te 
any proc e ss o r set of programs d e sired by a ny user. Se t s of 
routines must be available which ca n be called in by the depres-
sion of t he appropriate k e y. 
Parseg ian (1973, p. 15) co mpares a c omputer to the body and sen-
sory system of man: 
A virtue of the electronic computer is its ability to 
re ceive and to hol d in memory many signals th a t represent 
information, given to it throu gh t he lan guage of the binar y 
code or of o the r symbols. The computer op e r a t e s on this 
"information" throu g h preselected techniques and in resp onse 
to new signals or results of computations. In this resp ec t it 
is like the body and sensory system of man, which r e ceives si gnals 
from sensory re cepto rs and tran sforms thes e into meaningful 
information. 
Salton (1970) believes th e first compariso n of c on vention a l re -
trieval with automatic text processing systems was made by Swanson in 
th e late 1950's usin g 100 documents and 50 queries. Sa lt on (1970, p. 33 7) 
qu o tes Swanson's report: 
It is expected that the relative superiority of mach i ne 
text searching to conventional retrieval will bec ome greater 
with subsequent experimentation as retrieval aids for text 
searching are improved, wh e reas no clear procedure is in evidence 
which will guarantee improvement of the c onventional systems . 
... Thus even though machines may never enjoy more t han a partial 
success in library indexing, a smaller suspicion might justifiably 
be entertained that people are even less promising . 
40 
Can a machine thi nk ? Sel fr i dge a nd Ne iss er (1 96 0, p . 50 ) g ives 
us th e a n swer to this old chestnut by saying: 
... certainly yes: Computers have been made to pla y chess 
and checkers, to prov e t heor ems, to solve intri cate problems of 
strat egy. Yet t he int e lli ge nce impl i ed by such ac t ivi ti es ha s an 
elusive, unnatural qualit y . It is not b ased on any orderl y 
d eve lopm en t of cognitive skills. In particular, th e machines 
are not well e quipp ed to s ele ct fro m th e ir e nvironm e nt t h e things, 
o r the relations, they are goi ng to think a bout. 
In this they are sharply distin gui s hed f rom int el ligent living 
or ganisms . Ev e ry child lear ns t o a na l y z e speech into meanin g ful 
patterns l ong before he can prove any pr opositi on s. Computers can 
fin d proofs, but they ca nnot understand th e sim ples t spok e n in-
structions. Eve n th e earl i e st co mput e rs co uld d o a rithm e tic 
superbly, but only ver y r ecen t ly have they begun to re ad the 
wri tten dig its t hat a child re cogn iz es befo re he learns to add 
them. Unde r standi n g s peech and r eading print are exam p les of a 
basic intellectual skill th a t can var i o usly be ca l le d co gnition, 
abstraction o r pe r cep tio n; p e rh aps th e best ge n era l term for it 
is pattern recognition. 
Kucera ( 19 69) describes a c omput e r as muc h more than a mac hi ne 
for performin g ca l cu l at i on s. He b el i eves t h at aside f r om their ma th e -
mati c a l ope r a ti ons , computers ca n pro cess , o r ga ni ze, compare, an d 
man ipul ate data of a non-nu meri cal nature includi n g textual in:orma-
tion. He concl u des th a t it is this capacity of compute r s to deal wi th 
l etters, words, sentences, or even who l e texts th a t has made th em of 
considerable im po rt a n c e in the study of l a ngua ge . 
Machine l ea r ni ng 
Hunc (1962) vi ews mechanical conc e pt lear n e rs in the same manner 
as biological concept learn e rs whi ch ac quir e categorizations ba sed on 
an int e rnal repr e sent a tion o f an external object. Hunt believes that 
the transfo rmat io n which creates th is repres e ntati on can be either a 
"p arallel" one producing elements to whi c h respons e str e ngths are 
associated, or in its e lf subject to le a rn i n g durin g a particular 
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concept learning task. He concludes that categoriza ti on in concept 
learning involves the manipulation of coded symbols representing the 
obje c ts to be categorized. 
Parsegian (1973) views perception as "sensation plus past experi -
ences ." He feels that it is possible for identical stimuli to yield 
quite different understanding . He concludes that perception will differ 
depending on the state of the body generally, the emotional and mental 
set. purposeful selection, experiences from the past, memory, 
attention, ego-defense functions, and judgement that precede or 
accompany each stimulus. 
Hunt et al . (1966) describe concept learni ng as a hierarchical 
process . In other words, they believe that an org a nism must have a 
concept in order to learn more concept s . It follows then that an y 
value of an attribute is itself a conc e pt, and when we speak of con-
cept learning devices, we are talking about devices which discover 
rules for combining previously learned concepts to form a new deci-
sion ru l e. Hunt e t al. (1966) view concept learning as a type of 
inductive reasoning. 
Like perception, everyone agrees that memory is imp ortant in 
concept learning, but no on e has a clea r idea of how it is important. 
Shepard (1964) views the problem-solving ability of an organism as 
dependent in considerable measure upon the association structure of 
its memory and consequent efficiency with which it is able t o retrieve 
from memory that which is most relevant to a give n situation. He 
points out th a t such associative connections which are not yet bui l t 
into the hardware of modern computers is implemented in pr og rammin g 
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systems such as IPL and LISP. He states that these programs provide 
for the symbolic linking of each newly-stored item of information to 
any previously - stor e d items so as to form lists or "trees." 
Hunt (1962) describes a computer as capable of storing all the 
information it ever received. He feels that it could use this bank 
of knowledge t o evaluate proposed answers as they occurred. He 
fur t her states that a computer co u ld store a ll conceivable hypotheses 
with a current belief in each of them, and could thereby reason 
inductively without storing any specific information; each time the 
computer encount e red a new piece of data, it could use it to readjust 
its beli e f in the plausibility of each of the hypotheses. 
Continuing this dis c ussion, Hunt (1969) conclud e s that a newly 
developed hypoth e ses is evaluated by an o r ganism first on needed 
evidence and th e n on whether or not this evidence is available. He 
believes that the first step is not a memory task and that the second 
step do e s not require the organism to remember every t hing about a 
particular ins t ance . He feels that the organism must instead search 
its memory to discover whether or not a particular subset of descrip-
tive elements has or has not occurred jointly with a particular naming 
response. 
Hunt (1962) describes a strategy as a plan for arriving at a 
predefined goal at minimum cos t. He describes the goal in concept 
learning as the attainment of a definition of a concept which provides 
a satisfactory decision rule for assigning names to objects. He 
concludes that it ca n b e imagined that le arning progresses by a cumu-
l ative procedure in which an organism saves time by le a rning to 
apply the current strategy, and to change strategy . 
Arbib (1972) points out that an organism seeks enough cues to 
classify stimuli as pertaining to a known object, rath er than tryin g 
to account for all the details of the visual input. Indeed a who l e 
43 
movement called Gestalt psychology has taken shape within the past 
half century to emphasize the i dea that perceptions are not c re ated 
from particles of sensations . Parse g ian (1973) describes perception 
and mental ac ti vities in gene r al as deriving significance from the 
relationship to each o ther of the parts that mak e up the total picture. 
Hunt (1962) implies that problem-solving for an artifici al intel-
ligence system could consist of the application of Test-Operate -Te st-
Exist (TOTE) units. He describes a TOTE unit as a t es t to determine the 
difference between current knowledge and th e desired state, operating to 
reduce these differences, and then testi ng a gain. He believes thi s t yp e 
of cognitive psychology makes a stron g appeal to the computer program as 
a model . A computer can be programmed to test data, to operate to 
reduce differences, and then to retest. The answer produced wou ld be 
a combined product of the input data and the oper a t ors made available 
to the program. 
Upon further examination, Hunt (1962) discovered that an artifi -
cial intelligence model must co ntain some provision for changing a nd 
improving its performance. He feels that this change could be handled 
by a TOTE unit that observed the performance of a subsidiary unit. He 
views this subsidary un it as the strate gy . When the master unit tested 
it and found it wanting, it would be repla ce d. He believes that as 
experience was gained, stronger a nd stron ge r failure t es ts could be 
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made, so that faulty strategies would be detected earlier. 
Hunt (1962, p. 184) tells us that a faulty strategy could be 
replaced with several o ther TOTE units if a failure were detected: 
On the particular problem und e r consider a tion it might 
not be a matter which unit was used. But on a s econd problem 
th ere might be a very great difference. One of the things that 
th e subject might learn is what to do when the c urrent strategy 
fails. Learning t o select TOTES is similar to "learning to 
learn." ... In the TOTE a nal ysis an y t ransfer study is a study 
of indu c tive problem solving or, perh aps, concept learning. The 
objects are problems which can be descr ibed by their physical 
structure and by the feedback (e.g., su cc ess or failure of a 
parti c ular op e ration) received when a strat egy is applied to them. 
By observing this feedback, the concept learner could develop 
concep t s to define the types of problems on which particular 
strategies will work. Often his experience will not be suffi-
cient to permit him to learn an unequivocal concept about problems. 
Therefore he will have to guess about th e "best" s trate gy to try; 
at some tim e this guess may lead him into an incorrect classi -
fication. This would be r evealed by a n incorrect choice of 
strategy. 
Hunt (1962, p. 276) explains that "concept learning can be thou ght 
of as a technique for solving a n indu ct ive problem in symbolic l og ic 
throu gh the us e of information-proce s sing routines. Such an analysis 
can and should be no less rigorous than any mathematical theor y of 
learning." 
Simon and Kavovsky (1963, p. 539) describe a list processing 
language a s a system of processes for acting upon symbolic informa-
tion represented in th e form of lists and list structures (lists of 
lists). Among the fundamental processes in such a lan guage are the 
process of writing or produ c ing a symbol, th e process of copying a 
symbol (i.e., writing a symbol that is the same as th e given symbol), 
and the process of finding the symbol that is next to a given symb o l 
on a list. In addition, there are processes for inserting symbols in 
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lists, deleting s~nbols from lists, and otherwise modif y ing l ists and 
list structure s ." 
Selfrid ge and Neisser (1960 ) view a n o rg an ism as continuously 
exposed to g reat amounts of data from its s enses. An o r ga nism abstracts 
patterns from this data relevant to its activity at the moment. Th ey 
feel the ability of an organism to solve problems, prove theorems and 
run its life depends on th is type of perception. They are convinced 
that until programs are developed t o perceive patt e rns, ac hievements 
in mechanical problem-solving will remain isolated t ec hnical triumphs. 
Gyr e t al . (1966) conclude that the passiv e a pproach to per-
ception, since it is not conce rned with the contributions the organism 
its elf mak es to perc e ption, assumes that rul es on mode s or organiza-
tion of inputs a re someh ow given in the environment rather than parti-
ally affected by th e nature of the org a nism's interaction with th e 
env ironment. Gyr et al. (1966) further conclude that perception, or 
at l eas t perc e ptual develo pment, ought to be formulated a s a sensori-
motor or ac tive process if perce ptual dev e lopmen t , perceptual organi-
zation, and perceptual attention and selection are to be studi ed. 
Gyr et al. (1966) su gges t that any computer program which is based 
on a theory of perception as a passive pr oces s might code and 
organize its "prec ep ts" in t er ms of units which are often quit e 
irrelevant to the cod e s and organization employed by a living 
organism. If this is so, the progra m would have a limited usefulness 
as a tool in psychological res ea rch. Arbib (1972, p. 57) supports 
the con c lusi ons of Gyr et al. for us to consider an organism 
interacting with its environment: 
... The behavior o f the organism will be inf l u enc ed by 
aspects of the c urr en t activity of th e environment - we speak 
of these aspects as constituting the input to the organism -
whereas the activity o f the environment will be responsive 
to as p ects of the curren t activity o f the organism - we speak 
of these as pects as constituting the output of th e organism . 
Though ou r cu rr en t models may not sufficiently stress this 
fact, our long-ran g e theories must not f a il to emph as ize th a t 
we do not have is ola t ed passive organisms upon which inputs 
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just impinge from the out side , but rather organisms and e nviron-
men t in mutua l interaction. The outputs of t he o r ganism may be 
construed as inp ut s to th e envi ronm ent, and vice versa. 
Th e views on the relations b e t wee n the material universe a nd 
t he men t al pr ocesse s of an or ga ni sm set some clearly defined limits to 
th e knowledge that we ca n ac quire of the events that occur in this 
universe. Th e chain of even t s th a t Rosenblueth (1 970) accep t e d f o r 
human percepti on was th e following: material pr o cess es -+selective 
ac ti va tion of some receptors-+ coded affe r ent mes sa ges-+ cent ral neu r onal 
a nd cor r ela t ed menta l events. He beli e ve s th e knowledge a n organism 
can acqui r e about the ma t erial events i n its env iron men t will depend 
on th e properties of its receptors and n ervo u s sys t ems. Fr om t his he 
concludes th at the mater i al univ e rs e wh i ch a n or ganism constructs, 
inf e rs, or postulates will be d etermi ne d a nd limited by tho se prop e r-
ties. Rosenblueth (1970) fu rth e r concludes th at th e so - called 
secondary qualities of th e material entities such as colors , pi t c h 
of sounds, etc ., are mental and not material characteristics. 
Rosenb lu e th (1970) s t ates th at a n o r ganism acquires n ew co n di -
tionin g s thr o u gho ut its life as it learns an d acq uires a memory. He 
believes the neuronal re act ions of the brain of an o r gan ism to a 
given stimulus are determined not onl y by wha tever innate inter-
n e uro na l connections t he organism may poss e ss bu t also by its previous 
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experiences and th e traces which they leave on its nervous system. He 
feels that this is a dualistic philosophy in that we are asserting on 
the one hand the existence of our mental processes and on the o ther 
that of a material universe which determines the physical processes 
that develop in the brain of an organism. Rosenblueth (1970) concludes 
that an or ga nism invents or postulates a material universe in order to 
r a tionalize its perceptions. Arbib (1972, p. 64) tells us that the 
"current output of the [neuronal] network ne ed in no sense be~ response 
~ the current input regarded as stimulus. Rather, the firing of those 
neurons which feed the output c an be influenced by activity within the 
network reflecting quite ancient history of the system." 
Arbib ( 19 72) believes that the "brain " interacts with "environ-
ment" on the basis of an internal model. He feels its interaction 
must be designed to update its internal ,nod e l as well as to change its 
relationship with the external world in some desired way. He concludes 
tha t a brain ne e ds a broad data base or int er nal mode l of the world i n 
order to successfully interact with a compl ex environment. The result 
is that the utilit y of a relatively s imple model of the world can be 
impr oved if an organism can adjust parameters in its br a in to adapt to 
new and changing circumstances. 
Continuing this discussion, Arbib (1972) explains that a normal 
mode of walkin g requires an extensive r e liance upon our model of the 
immedi a te world to provide a feed-forward type of control of walking. 
He concludes that in the stepping or seeking mode of walking, each step 
is dependent on fed-back information about the spot on which the foot 
will land. 
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Arbib (1972) believes that as an organism matures, the " computer" 
in its head becomes so adjusted that its actions become better adapted 
to a whole range of properties of the world in addition to those that 
confront its senses at the very moment. The word "model" in the phrase 
"i nternal model of the world" is to be used in this abstract s e nse ra t her 
than some more pictorial sense. He calls the internal model of the 
world which an organism possesses "long t erm memory" - the collection of 
properties which reflect past experience in a way which will help an 
organism compute its present behavior and improve t he model it self. " He 
refers to short term memory as a n internal model that represents the 
current surroundings of an organism . Arbib (1972, p. 91) explains : 
... We do no t perceive what we sense in front of ou r eyes . If 
we are in a room, we perceive our presence in that room with what 
is in it so that we may, for example, reach for an object pre-
viously seen behind us, without sear ch in g for it anew. Our 
perception does not involve independe ,1tly processin g a succession 
of "snapshots" of the r oom, but rathe r involves an initial compre-
hension of the room and the more salient o f the contents, after 
which we need merely note discrep a ncies between our model and what 
we need to know of what is out there to "fi ll in gaps" and update 
this momentar y model - as when we rea c h for that object behind us 
only to find that someone h a s moved it. We repeat that this 
modeling and updating is all encoded in terms of the properties 
and activities of neurons and has little resemblance to a photo-
graphic record. 
Arbib (1972) s t resses that he r egards a perc e iving system as 
representing its environment in terms of possible motor options, rat he r 
than creating a "littl e copy of the world" in any photographic sense. 
Parsegian (1973) feels that cybernetics is not only concerned 
with neurological processes, but is also concerned with a search for 
comparable capacities for learning, memory, and recall in the electronic 
computer. Cyb e rneti cs involve s th e interactions of machi nes or organisms 
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with the environment. He believes that these interactions involve an 
element of purpose and make use of control principles addressed to 
those p urposes. These interactions also involve feedback. 
Pars egian (1973) v iews the results of any act as b e ing fed back 
to modify the initi a l act, the feedback taking the form of information . 
He feels that each cybernetic system represents a dynamic situation in 
which energ y is utiliz ed to respond to changes and yet to main t ai n 
stability of sorts. He concludes that this utilization of control of 
energy constitutes a primar y interest of cybernetic s whether the energy 
is mechani cal or human . 
Continuin g this discussion, Parse g i a n (1973) s ees the hu man brain 
as being capable of receiving sensory signals and of processing these 
to b ecome inf o rmat ion that either immediately influences action or is 
stored for future use. He believes in t he case of the neural syst em, 
in fo rmati on emerging as a product of neural proce sses becomes incor-
por a ted as awareness or memory. He concludes that in like manner, the 
compu t er may incorporate the answers to its calculations in its own 
memory system for use with future calculations. 
Parsegi a n (1973) believes there is a mental set which de termines 
whether or not an or ga nism responds to a particular stimulus. He views 
this inner reaction of an organism to be as necessary as the external 
stimulus for the development of per ce ptual consciousness of what is 
going on. He states that even initial perceptu a l consciousness 
developes only with a coordinated activity of sensory receptors and 
the inner functions of the brain ; this process occurs through the use 
of earlier experiences and memory as a base. He co ncludes that the 
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process of perc e ption appears to be co mpleted through judgment, c ompari-
son, selectivity of stimuli, modification of stimuli, and espe cially 
identification of a clearer causal relationship between object and 
stimulus. 
Arbib (1972) contends that the "level" of an or gan ism determines 
how much of its own a ctivity is wired-in and how much is learned. In 
any case, he feels that the sensory system takes the physical in put 
deri ved from the environment a nd conv e rts this in the form of a vast 
nu mbe r of sensations to the nervous system and the brain. He further 
believes th at the brain in turn must accept, int egra te, and ascribe 
meaning to the sensations according to immediate or ea rlier experiences. 
He views many of these inte gr ative functions as takin g place automati-
cally, utili zing only the extensive neu rJ l interconnections within th e 
neural system other than the cortex. He vi ews the human nervous system, 
however, as capable of hi ghe r associative functions. He concludes that 
t h e ab ility of the huma n brain to interpret the si gn ificance of sens a -
tions, to think, to originate ide as , and to activate fun c tions called 
for by va rious situations are e xamples of hi gher associative functions 
executed by the human nervous system. 
Parsegian (1973) describes the flow of nerv e impuls es in the 
nervous system as producin g a unidirecti onal con trol over fl ow . He 
likens this property of directional conduction through a synapse, or 
nerve connection, in the human brain to a diode rectifier, which is 
common in digital computer circuits. Both the computer and the nervous 
system depend on the flow of information being controlled through 
unidire c tion al units. 
Parsegian (1973) points out that nearly thre e quarters of all 
neuronal cell bodies of the human nervous system are locat e d in the 
cerebral cortex of the brain. He tells us that one of the principal 
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func tion s of the cerebral cortex is to store information and memory of 
experiences. He c ontends that here in the cortex we find the most ad-
vanced forms of re a sonin g , integration of information, and planning of 
action taking place. Parsegian (1973) continues to point out that the 
most abstract process es of thought and the highest levels of assoc ia-
tion of in forma tion and of concepts take place in the prefrontal lobe 
in portions of the temporal and partietal lobes. 
Hunt (1962) believes that a problem is solved when an adequate 
path is found from a possible problem (s ti mulus) to a possible so l ution 
(r e sponse). He views an ar tifici al intelligence system as nothing 
more than a set of instructions for selecting a path. The system 
should always find the solution to a given probl em . He explains th a t 
any computing system which has this characteristic is c alle d an algor -
ithm. An algorithm i s a search method which will produce the correct 
response for any stimulus in the set of pos sible stimuli. 
Hunt (1962) goes on to conclude that an intelligent machine must 
be able to do more than observe its own internal state . It must be 
able to observe where it is located in the entire problem-solving envi-
ronment. Hunt (1962, pp. 202-204) presents the following explanation: 
. .. It is not enough to know that the solution offe red is not 
correct, we should know what are the differences between the solu -
tion offered a nd desired. The simplest such information is the 
relative distance between two offered solutions . Suppose an 
artificial intelligence produces two responses and keeps a 
record of how the responses are produced . If one solution is 
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better than the other, although neither were adequate, it could be 
a good heuristic to assume that the processes unique to the bett e r 
response were desirable. 
The way a predesi gn ed artificial intelligence moves thr ou gh 
its environment is to apply operators to its present solution to 
transform it into a new solution .... Every syste m, includin g a 
random system, has operators that it can apply in a search for a 
solution. If the syste m is to satisfy Ashby's criteria for intel-
li ge nce it must be answered: Can the operator be applied at all? 
Will th e a pplic at i on of t h is ope ra tor (probably) result in a move 
toward solution? To do this, the artific ia l intelli ge nce must 
have concepts. In pro gressin g through the spa c e of possible 
solutions the problem-solvin g mec hanism must continually evaluate 
th e dif fere nce between the desired results. Newell, Shaw, and 
Si mon suggested that differences could be used to describe the 
overall situation. The problem solver could have a concept, 
based on differences, of situations in which the app licati on of 
operator x, y, z, etc. usually reduced th e differences. 
Deciding whether or not an operator can be applied is of t e n 
a s trai ght f orward que st ion. For instance, we kn ow that, now and 
for a ll time, we can find t he loga rithm of x only if xis a posi-
tive real number. We can sp ecify rules for deciding whether or 
not a particular operator c an be applied to a situation. It is 
much harder to s pecify when a machine should decide to apply a 
particular opera t or, a l though severa l o ther operators c ould be 
applied. Sp ec if ying a decision rule to answer this question is 
equivalen t to stating how to decide on a good move in problem 
solving. If a machine is designed to a tt ack prob lems t ha t are a t 
all c ompl ex (e.g., symbol ic lo g i c , chess, and even concept l ea rnin g) 
we will not be able to specify all the situations in whi ch the 
machine will have to make a c hoice. We may not even be able to 
partition the univers e of poss ible c hoice points into useful 
classes of c hoice situations. The be s t approach we can t ake is 
to provide the machine with h eu risti c rules for selecting the 
operation th at will probably move it clos er to a solution. But 
"moving closer to a solution" is a slippery def i nition. A truly 
intelli ge nt machine should have several ways of ev a luat i ng this 
phas e and should be able to choose among them. Newell, Shaw , 
and Simon point out that a mach ine that could generate alternate 
descriptions of the choice situations it encountered a nd then 
choose among these description s would be an "intelli ge nt le arner ." 
As it gained ex perienc e , it would become a bett e r problem solver 
because it would discover better ways of looking a t its e nviron-
ment. 
Let us discuss artificial intelligence with ref e rence to human 
problem solvin g . Hunt (196 2 ) believes that if we define "concept" in 
symbolic terms, it is possible to build an a ut omatic concept-learning 
symbol-manipulating device; it is difficult, however to build an 
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efficient one. He feels that when we try to devise an artificial 
concept learner, we may come away with more respect for human data-
handling capabilities. He tells us that humans learn complex concepts 
under an amazing number of barriers such as imperfect memory. 
Hunt (1962) explains that each "nerve" inside the digital com-
puter is represented by a set of numbers specifying the current state 
of its parameters. He points out that all computations are carried 
out in a linear sequence when a stimulus is presented, as numerical 
operations, since the computer is a linear device. Hunt (1962, p. 215) 
cites Von Neumann : 
... Von Neumann suggested that this may demonstrate the 
basic difference between a computer and a brain; in the biologi-
cal organism the computation is a truly parallel operation (with 
the possibility of interaction between computations, as in Kohler's 
field theory of brain activity) using a nalog computational methods. 
In addition, the sheer number of units in biological systems - much 
greater than the number of neurons th a t can be represented wi t hin a 
modern digital computer - limits the realism of the simulation. 
Any behavior which, in the living brain, depends on the number of 
neurons cannot be represented in the simulation. 
Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963), explain the goal of artific~l intel-
ligence as the construction of computer programs which exhibit behavior 
that we call "int e lligent behavior" when we observe it in human beings. 
Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963, p. 4) go on to answer the question of 
whether o r not a computer does exactly what it is told to do and nothing 
more: 
... This statement - that computers can do only what~ are 
programmed~ do - is intuitively obvious, indubitably true, and 
supports none~ the implic ations that are commonly drawn f rom it. 
~ human being can think, le arn , and create because the program 
hi s biological endowmen t gives him, to gether with the c ha n ges in 
that program produced ]2y interaction with his environment after 
birth enables him to think, learn, and create. If a computer 
thinks, learns, and creates, it will be by virtu-;-of ~ program 
that endows it with these capacities. Clearly this will not be~ 
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program - any more than the human's is - that calls for hi ghly 
stereotyp ed a nd repetitive behavior indepen dent of the stimuli 
coming from the environment and the task !_Q b e comule te d . 1!_ will 
be~ program that makes the sys t em's behavior hi gh ly co nditi onal 
on th e t a sk environment - on the task goals and on the clues 
ext r acted from the e nvironment that indicate whether progress is 
being made toward tho se goals. 1!_ will be~ program that analyzes, 
E.Y_ some mean s, its own performance, diagnoses its failures, and 
makes changes tha t enha nc e its future e f fec tiven e ss. 
Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963 ) elaborate on the foregoing by telling 
us that it is wrong to conclude that a computer can exhibit behavior no 
more intelligent than its hu man programmer. They feel that it is also 
wrong to conclude that a human programmer can accurarely predict the 
behavior of his prog r am . They believe that such conclusions presume 
that a human pr ogrammer can comprehend the remote cons e quen ces of a 
program which establishes gene ral prescriptions for adaptive behavior 
in a compu t er . More importantly, they be li e ve this pr esumes that a 
human programmer can perform the same co mpl e x information processing 
operations equally well with the device within his head. 
Arbib (1972, p. 69) feels th ere is a deeper reas on for the success 
of compu ting machines which has nothin g to do with their circuitry , 
but r es t s on a basic l o gica l propert y of algorithms ... 
... n amel y, that an algorithm can be specified in far fewer 
st eps than it takes to execute it (i.e., c ar ry it out with 
particular data). At first this seems paradoxic al , for one ca n 
imagine l eaving out a few instruction s on a gi ven execution, but 
may be hard put t o ima g ine where new on es come f ro m! The resolu-
tion is simple - alg orith ms often contain se quen ces of instructions 
which may be paraphrased as "keep r e pea ting the fo llowin g s teps 
until y ou've go ne fa r enough." To make th is quite literal, co n-
sider the followin g algorithm for telling a human how to find a 
door in a totally dark room. (For simplicity, we shall assume 
that all furniture is obligingly rem ove d from our path, and that 
the door is closed). The verbal instructions we might give a 
human would be: "Walk to the wall, then walk along the wall 
until you find the door." This might then be broken do wn into 
the followin g sequence of "unit operations." 
1. Extend left hand in front of you. 
2. Does hand touch th e wall or doo r ? 
If answer is YES: Go to inst ruction 5. 
If answer is NO: Go to instruction 3 . 
3. Take one small pace, advancing the l eft and 
right feet equally. 
4 . Go to inst rucci on 2. 
5. With left hand still touchin g the wall or 
door, turn till it is to your left. 
6. Does hand feel a door? 
If answer is YES: Go to instruction 9. 
If answer is NO: Go to instruction 7. 
7. Take one small pace, advan cin g the left and 
right feet equally. 
8. Go to instruction 6. 
9. STOP (o r: transfer to next program of action 
appropriat e t o having found doorway). 
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We doubt that a computer can really acc ompl ish anything by trying 
out many pro grams and keeping a record in which each instruction is 
associated with the successes and failures of programs containing it. 
If this procedu re could l ead to some pr og ress, the que s tion may arise 
as to whether or not the simplest probl e m woul d require t he trial of 
an astronomical number of programs. An experiment was begun to test 
a learni n g procedure of this type. A h ypothetical computer was 
designed for this reason and called Herman. Friedberg (1958, p. 4) 
describes Herman: 
... Herman has a very simple logic such that every number of 
14 bits is a meanin g ful instructi on and e very se quence of 64 
instructions is a performable pro g ram. An outside agent called 
the Teacher causes Herman's pro gram to be pe rf ormed many times 
and examines Herman's memory each time to see whether a desired 
t ask has been performed succ e ssfully in that trial. The Teache r' s 
announcements of success and failure enable a t hird element, the 
Learner, to evaluate the differ e nt instructions which, on differ -
ent oc casions, appear in Herman' s program. Basin g its acts on 
this evaluation, the Learner tries to includ e "good" instructions 
in the program rather th an "bad" ones. Th e experiment is run by 
simulation of these three elements on the IBM 704 Electronic 
Data Pro cessing Machine. 
Frieberg (1958, p. 6) co ntinues his description of Herman: 
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... The routine cha nges enable the Learner to accumulate 
th e data on th e relative success of the two instructions on 
record for each location and gradually to favor th e more 
successful instruction. The random changes are mad e in order 
that the Learner not be restrict ed to the 264 programs that can 
be made from the instructions on record a t a ny one tim e. 
Both the routine and the r a ndom changes are governed 
l a r gely by a number associated with each instr uc tion on record, 
called its " succe ss n umber ." The success number is suppo sed to 
indicate how well an instruction has served ove r many thousands 
of previous tri a ls. Each time a success is reported, the s uccess 
number of eve ry a ctive instru c tion is increased by 1. (If the 
program fini shed the successful trial before executing more than 
32 instru c tions, the success numbers are increased by 2 ins t ead 
of 1. This is done in order to e nc ou rage the development of 
pr og rams that do not take long t o finish, because it was antici -
pated th at the success of the pr o j ec t migh t depend on the number 
of t rials th a t could be simulat ed in the limited compute r time 
avail able. ) 
. .. Thus the frequency with which each i nstru ction on record 
is active depends partly on its long-term rec o rd, repres en ted by 
its success number. When a ce rt ain set of instructions has been 
found to be successful in one prob le m and the Teacher now com -
mences t o pose another problem, it is intended that th e frequent 
failures of the established program t o perform the new problem 
will indu ce th e Le ar n er to a lt er th e pr og ram and to use most 
frequently the instructions that are most often successful at t he 
new problem. At the same time the i ns tructions that were success -
ful at the old problem ought not to b e "forgotten," but should 
(at least for some t ime) retain their h igh success numbers, so 
that if the old pro blem is presented agai n the "memory " of th ese 
instructions will aid the Lear n e r t o a rriv e at a successful pro -
gram . It should be emphasized that a c hange of problem is not 
signaled explicitly to the Le a rn e r but makes its elf felt so le ly 
thr ough the r epo rt of success or failure after each tr ial . The 
ability of the Lear ner to as so ciate an instruction with a hig hly 
fav o rable long -t erm record, even while that instructio n is 
currently inactive be caus e it does not serve well in the pro blem 
at han d , is felt to be e ssential to the retention of things once 
l ea rne d . 
Friedberg (1958, p. 7) concludes his description of Herman: 
Herman, th e Learner, and the Teacher a re simulated tog e ther 
in the IBM 704. The program runs from 5,000 to 10,000 tri als of 
Herman each minut e , includi ng the intervening acts of the Teacher 
and Learner. The a c tual execution of Herman's pro gram is the most 
time consuming part of each tri a l. The part of the pro gram that 
simul a tes the Teacher is rewritten or altered from day to day so 
as to present different problems o r introduc e modifications into 
the Learner. At the end of each day's run the IBM 70 4 pun c hes out 
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binary cards representing the state of Herman and the Learn e r. 
At the start of a later run, th ese cards can be read in so that 
the run will continue as thou gh th e 704 ha d not stopped, with the 
same active and inactive instructions, success numbers, and state 
numbers as a t the end of the previous run. 
Friedberg et al. (1959) tell us th a t a learning machine might 
le a rn to perform a task without bein g told how to perform it, but it 
would stil l have to be told exactly how to learn. They feel that for 
a machine like Herman to arrive at a program for solving problems 
simply from seeing whether trial runs succeed or fail depends in large 
part on having some efficient way of s e lecting one imperfect pr o gram 
over anoth e r. They believe the ability to partition p r o blems a nd to 
deal with the parts on orde r of difficulty would se em helpful. They 
state that wi th this framework in mind, it is worthwhile to note the 
a n a logy be t ween machine learning and th e p roblem solvin g technique of 
dir ec t e d mac hine sear c h. 
Hunt (1965, p. 214) mentions that "inf orm ation processing theories 
of concept learnin g have also been prop o sed. 11 He has d eveloped a c om-
puter progr am for mimi cking concept-learning behavior of humans . 
This program looks on concept learning as a decoding problem, 
and contains heuristics which en a ble it to "guess" an answer be-
fore one has been defined uniquely. This pro gram responds solely 
to the informa tion content of the stimulus sequence . 
Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963, p. 300) d e scribe a computer p r ogram 
which simulates ver bal learning behavior. This program is called EPAM, 
El emen tary Perceiver and Memorizer. 
Performance and Learnin g Conceptuall y , EPAN can be broken 
down into two subsystems, a performance system and a learning 
system . In the performance mod e , EPAM produces responses to 
stimulus it ems. In the learning mode, EPAM learns to discriminate 
and associate items. 
The performanc e system is the simpler of the two . When a 
stimulus is noticed, a perceptual process encodes it, producing 
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an internal represent atio n ( an input code). A d i sc riminator 
sorts the input code in a discrimination net (a tree of tests 
and branch es ) to find a st o red image of the stimulus. A res-
ponse cue associated with th e image is found, and fed to the 
discri minator. The discriminator sorts the cue in the net and 
finds the response image, the stored form of the res ponse. The 
response image is then dec ode d by a response g e nerator letter by 
letter in another discrimination net into a form sui t able for 
output. The response is th e n produced as output. 
The proce sses of the lea rning syst em are more complex . 
The discrimination learning process builds discriminations by 
growin g the net o f tests and bran c hes. The a s sociation process 
builds associations between images by storing response cues with 
stimulus images. The EPA.M performance process fo r producing the 
res pon se a ssociated with a s ti mul us is as fo llow s : 
Raw stimulus 
Perceive features of stimulus t 
11 ---~ ------·--- -··-·---·-------+ EPAi~ stimulus input 
_,,/~'-.... 
_,.,., ..... 
.,/ Dis c riminat e 
// sti mulu s to find 
L./ stimul us image 
+ Ima ge 




/ .,..~ c ue to find re-
sponse image 
+ Response i mage 
General resp onse to 
environment usin g decoding net 
L--- ·- -·----------------' 
Response outp ut 
Figure 3. EPAM performance process. 
code 
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Feigenbaum an d Feldman (1963, p. 306) continue their description 
of EPAM as th ey explain the computer program employed: 
The EPAM model has been realized as a program in Information 
Processing Language Vandis currently being run both on the 
Berkeley 7090 and the RAND 7090. Descriptive information on the 
computer reali za tion, and also the complete IPL-V program and 
data struct ure s for EPAM (as it stood in October, 1959) are given 
in an earlier work by the author (1959). IPL-V, a list processing 
languag e , was well suited a s a language for the EPAM model for 
these reasons: 
a. The IPL-V basic pro ce sses deal explicitly and direct l y 
with list structures. The various information struc-
tures in EPAM (e.g., discrimination net, image list) 
are ha ndled most easily as list s tru ctures. In de ed, 
discrimination is, virtually by definition, a list 
structure of a simple type. 
b. It is useful in some places, and necessary in ot hers, 
to store with some symbols informati on descriptive of 
these symbols. IPL-V's description list and descrip t ion 
list processes are a good answer to this need. 
c. The facility with which hierarchies of subroutine control 
can be written in IPL-V mak es ea sy and uncomplicated the 
pro gramm in g of the kind of 2omplex control sequence which 
EPAM uses. 
Newell and Simon (1961, p. 2014) des c ri be a computer program 
called the General Problem So lver as a "pro g ram comprise d of rather 
general processes for reasonin g about ends ( goa ls and means opera-
tors ):" 
... It is ge neral in the sense that the program itself makes 
no reference to the precise nature of the objects, differences, 
and operators with which it is dealing. Hen ce , its problem-
solving capabilities ca n b e transferred from one kind of task 
to another if it is provided with information about the kinds of 
objects, differences, and operators that characterize and des-
cribe the par ticul a r task environment it is to handle. Thus, 
to solve logic problems, it must be provided with a format for 
representing logic ex pressions, test s for the differences that 
must be recognized between pairs of expressions, and a list of 
th e allowable operators . The rules of the game it is to play 
must be described to it . 
... At the grosses t level, we may ask whether the program 
does, in fact, solve prob l ems of some of the sorts that humans 
solve. This it demonstrably does. Hence we may say that its 
program constitutes a syst e m of mechanism, constructed from 
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elementary information processes, that is sufficient for solving 
some problems . It provides an unequivocal demonstra tion that a 
mechanism can solve problems by functional reasoning. 
Linderman (1967) is convinced that the real problem is developing 
computer programs that not only organize inf orma ti on by subject bu t 
also are capable of logically reorganizing stored information in order 
to respond to the chang in g needs of library users. She feels the 
ultimate objective would be to extract underlying patterns of meaning 
from a complex information network. She believes the developments 
in programming suggest that a practical need will be felt more acutely 
in the future for a well -founded mathematical method of executing 
inductive inference, including hypotheses testing. She concludes that 
an artificial intelligence system would have to perform the entire 
inductive process, includin g the so-called "creative" work which is 
often considered a necessar y ingredient of inductive inference. 
Watanabe (1960, p. 208) mentions ten important features of inductive 
inference: 
1. Role of inductive inference. Inductive inf ere n ce contains, 
as a necessary ingredient, a constant comparison of the 
deductive consequence from a hypothesis with the experiment. 
Accordingly, the model t heory of inductive inference must 
permit deductive inference to play a corresponding role with-
in its framework. 
2. Logical refutation by counter-example. This is the most 
elementary step in inductive inference, in which a hypothesis 
is disqualified when the hypoth e sis excludes the occurrence 
of a certain event (observed datum) while actual experience 
shows that this forbidden event in fact occurs (is observed). 
3. Continuous measure of preferential co nfid e nce on hypo th eses . 
The essential theoretical difficulty concerning the process of 
inductive inference sterns mainly from the fact that there usu-
ally exist a great number of, indeed often infinitely many, 
hypotheses which are not logically refuted by the available 
evidence, and which are not necessaril y unanimous re gard ing 
the outcome of an observation which is not yet made kno~m. 
For this reason, inductive inference is often declared to be 
"logically" ill-founded. It should be noted, however, that 
in actual inductive inference, we usually pl ac e preference on 
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one hypothesis to another even though both are not logically 
refuted. 
4. Successive approach. The essence of scientific method resides 
not in discoverin g an absolute truth but in successive improv-
ment of knowledge. This is true whether the term "improvement" 
means the applicability of a theory to a broader domain of 
experience, or the capability of a theory in yieldin g more 
precis e agreement with the experimental measurement within a 
given domain of experience or a better fit of the predicted 
frequency distribution of various results with the experimental 
frequenc y. This basic natur e of scientific method must be 
reflect ed in any t heory of inductive inference. 
5. Effect of judgment from broader experience. A t est of hypothe-
ses must be defined by some obse rva t ional operation, and such 
a test must be instr umental in the abov e mentioned suc ce ssive 
impr ovemen t of the evaluation of the c r edibilities. However, 
in this actual evaluation, enough flexibility must be left to 
accomodate the consideration or iginatin g from a broader f i eld 
of experience, of which the test in que s tion represents only 
a small part. 
6. Absolute ce r tainty of validity of hypothesis denied. No 
hypothesis should be declared to be a law (i. e ., credibility 
unity ) on the basis of a finite number of observed data. This 
is closely connected with the fact that it is impossible to 
derive a conclusion (or a hypothes i s) for an infinite number 
of cases from the experience of a f inite number of c ases. 
7. Exi s tence of law with objective validity. Not withstandin g 
the r emar k (6) above , we cannot de n y the existence of a law 
(probabilistic or deterministic) governing a limited area of 
experience, for such denial would amount to r e nouncing 
scien ti fic quest in general . Corresponding to t his situatio n, 
it must be guaranteed that some hypothesis, whether or not 
already considered, r eaches credib ility unity in the limit 
where th e size of the body of evidence becomes infinitely 
large. And this selection of hypothesis must be indep enden t 
of any preconceived jud gement, except in th e case where there 
is more th an one "equivalent " hypothesis. 
8. Distinction between credibil ity and confirmability . As stated 
un der (3), credibility is the de gree of preferential confi-
dence. In other words , it is a re lative weight among the com-
pet itive hypothesis. As was seen in (6), the credibility is 
bound to be in fl uenc ed by the experience at large, except in 
the limiting case discussed under (7). Distinct from credi-
bility, there must be a certain measure of the degree to which 
a test (which is a series of the same type of observations) 
confirms a hypothesis individuall y tak e n, c ompletely inde-
pend e nt of the other hypothesis and of the experience outside 
the test in question. This degree of confirmation will be 
called confirmability and will be normalized so that it 
becomes unity when the confirmation becomes "p er fect." 
Although credibility and confirmability are conceptually 
distinct, a high confirmability must tend to increase the 
credibility. 
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9. Room for new hypotheses . Usually we cannot from the outset 
think of a ll the possible hypotheses to cope with a certain 
series of experiments. On the contr a ry, a new hy po thes is 
usually occurs to a scientist after he has accumulated acer-
tain amount of experimental facts. Th e refor e , the model theory 
of induction must be such that we c a n add a new hypotheses at 
any stage of the process of induction a nd let it compete with 
the other hypotheses which have already been considered. In 
this case, of course, past experience must also be re ce ived in 
the light of the new hypothe se s . 
10. Anti-ergodicity a nd inverse H-theorem. Inductive inference is 
a proces s such that the distribution of weights (credibilities) 
become increasin g ly concentrated on a decre a sing number of cases 
(hypothe se s) no matter how widely one distributes the weights 
initially . Loosel y speakin g , this is contrary to the tendency 
of an ergodic s t ochastic chain in which, no matter on what case 
one mi g ht put the weight initial ly, the distribution of weights 
g radually spreads out to all of the cases , which are 
"connected" to the initially chosen case . . . As the H-
theorem shows an increase (or nondecrease) of the entropy 
with time, in a certain sense of the average value, the in-
verse H-theorem can be expected to show a decr ease (or non-
increase ) of the indu c ti ve e ntropy with the g rowth of 
experience, in a certain sense of the avera ge. 
Hunt (1962) describe s self-organizing systems as systems which 
change their internal states in some rando m manner until they reach an 
integral stable state. He views a rtificial intelligence systems as 
cybernetic devices; the y emit a response that causes a user to i nput a 
reward signal or fail to input a reward signal, thus completing a 
feedback l oo p. He believes that self-organizing systems improve with 
practice within a g i ve n problem area. He concludes th a t they r eo r ga nize 
their internal information processor based on the feedback being 
received so that it is more efficient in producing the kind of input-
output mappings that are being required of it. 
Niesser (1963, p . 193) believes that an artificial intelligence 
system will soon be fully developed : 
Popul a r opinion about 11artificial intelli ge nce" has passed 
t hrou gh two phases. A genera t ion ago , very few people believed 
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that any machine could ever think as a man does . Now, however, 
it is widely held that this goa l will be reached quite soon, 
perhaps in our lifetimes. It is my thesis that the second of 
these attitudes is nearly as unsophisti ca t ed as the first. 
Yesterday's skepticism was based on ignorance of the capab il i t ies 
of machines; today ' s confidence reflects a mi sunders t anding of 
the nature of thou gh t . 
... Secondly, machines were once believed to be incapable of 
le arning from experience . We now know that machine learnin g is 
not only possible but es s ential in th e pe r for mance of many tasks 
th at mi gh t once have been thought not to require it . Simp le 
proble ms of pattern reco gnition, such as th e id e n tif ic at ion of 
h and - printing capital letters, have been solved only by programs 
which discover the c ritical characteris t ics of the stimu l i - for 
themselves. 
Finally, it has often been assert ed that machines ca n pro duce 
not hi n g novel, spontaneo u s, or creati ve - that they can "only do 
what the y have been pro gramm ed to do. 11 
.. . Existing programs hav e found original proofs for theorems , 
made unexpected move s in games, and the like . 
... The sheer amount of processing which a c omput e r do es can lead 
to re s ults t o which the adjective novel may honestly be ap plied. 
Indeed, complexity is the basis for emergent qualities wherever 
they are found in nature. 
Hormann (196 2) believes th at in or de r for an artificial intelli-
gence system t o be able to learn f rom a tr aini ng sequence and use this 
experience toward creating its own trial sequence of tasks, it must be 
able to construct and modify a " cognitive map ." He feels that the 
effective utilization of the cognitive map may be realiz ed by a special 
higher-level program called a 11master monitor" which t akes a larger 
view of th e tas ks given in the past rather th an focusing on one task 
at a ny g iven moment . It was shown earlier how perceptual processes 
employed in artificial intelligence systems can be organized to make 
initial analysis of probl em structures. This is accomp li shed by using 
previous experience stored in memory to reorg a nize and consequently 
recode a comp lex stimulus into a smaller number of familiar units. 
Induction is the p roc ess of ge n eralizi n g on th e particular. 
George (19 70) be lie ves t ha t this process c an be pe r f o rme d by a computer. 
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He concludes that if two or more even t s are associat ed all th e tim e , 
then that relationship can be described by an inductive generaliza ti on . 
Cherry (1961) implies that in order for an ar tifi cial intelli ge nce 
system to be adaptive to its environment, it must exhibit a vast con-
stantly changing matrix of conditional probabilities in all possible 
circumstances . He feels that this can be achieved by setting up a 
hierarchic structure of organizing sub-routines to determine thes e 
conditional probabilities. He views th ese conditional probabili ties 
as being interlocked in such a way a s to represent the structure of 
the environment with which the artificial intelligence system must 
interact. He concludes that we are in this sense filling out a world-
map ready to be consulted according to current nee d s and goals . 
Garvin (1963) stat es that the purpose o f an artifi ci al intelli gence 
system is to provide relevant responses to an environment . He views 
the information stored in a memory bank file when combined with a 
suitable program of operations to be perform e d on that information as 
a set of responses to the environment of ac tivit y on the file. He 
describes this file as consistin g of stored information concerning 
stored documents or hu manly stored patterns of response. He feels that 
in each case this file should provide a response to a particular t ype 
of environment. He further belie ves that this environment could be 
represented by a set of changes, additions, deletions or interrogations 
concerning the stored items. 
Hunt (1962, p. 207) exp lains the capabilities an ar tificial intel-
li gence system ought to have: 
... a di gital computer should be reco gnized as a list-
processing d evice - a type of computing machine originally 
65 
developed by Newell and his associates. List processing can be 
done by the use of a special int erpreter and requires no hardware 
modifications. Two such interpreters are in general use today, 
Information Processing Language (IPL-V) (Newe ll, 1961) and List 
Processing Langua ge (LISP)(McCarthy, 1960b). These interpreters, 
in effect, create a machine in which the logic of data storage 
and computation is the interpreter's and not the computer's. 
Hunt (1962, p. 211) continues this discussion: 
Set theory was central to the earlier discussion of concept 
learning. An artificial intelligence system ought to be able to 
manipulate sets, since these manipulations have such gene ral 
app lic abil it y. Writing artificial intelligence programs in list-
processing languages has the advantage th at th ese la n guages can be 
thought of as being a special set-theoret ic notation. A list may 
be equated with a set; the symbols on the list (not the cells on 
the list) become the elements of the set. The basic operations 
of union, inters ection, inclusion, and identity may be made to 
ref e r to l is ts of common and unique symbols on sp e cified lists or 
list structures. 
Horman (1962, pp. 347-367) describes in de t ail the internal 
mecha ni sms of an a rti ficial intelli gence system: 
The system of programs proposed here contain thre e essential 
components: a community unit responsible for manipulation and 
genera t ion of programs, execution of which leads to the system 's 
action (either overt or covert); a planning mechanism which t akes 
a lar ger view of a give n ta sk and guides the community unit by 
designating a rough sketch of a possible cou rse of ac tion; and 
an induction mechanism which takes a still larger view by consid-
ering the system's past experience with various p roblems and by 
attempting to apply that experience to related problems which h av e 
not previously been encountered. Higher level programs in the 
system which coordinate the functions of th e thr ee mechanisms 
initiate the task requests for activating each unit. 
The fu nction of the community unit is to provide th e higher-
level programs (customers) with pr og rams capable of performing 
reque s ted tasks, or to perform a customer-stipulated task by 
executing a program . If the community unit does not have a ready-
made pro gram in s toc k to fill a particular request, it will have 
to construct a program and debug it, befor e outputting or executing 
it. The process of constructing a tentativ e pro gram, testing, 
modifying, testing again, may have to be repeated many ti me s. 
Within the community unit the members of a team of routines 
are identified as the task analyzer, the program provider, and the 
executor-monitor . ... the interactions between th e executor -
monitor and the task analyzer comprise the first - order feedback-
loop. Its primary function is performance and error detection. 
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This part of the community unit resemb les the TOTE (Test-Operate-
Test-Exit) unit of Miller, Ga l an ter, and Pribram; the operate phase 
corresponds to t he executor-monitor and the test phase to the task 
analyzer. The TOTE unit is illustrated ... by a man using sensory 
feedback as he moves his arm in the hammering task. A second -or der 
feedback loop is used when a ll three members of the community unit 
interact. The primary function of this outer loop is the selection 
of operations and e rror correction on the basis of information from 
the first-order feedback loop. The task analyzer serves as a link 
between the two loops. 
The task analyzer co rresponds to the chief engineer in the 
machine shop and receives incoming requests either in appellat iv e 
or descriptive form. Since the use of the appellative form assumes 
th e correspondi n g pro g ram to be already in the memory, here we shall 
consider the descriptive form of the request with the unit havin g 
no previous experience directly relev ant to the assumed task. 
Also we s ha ll assume, for simplicity that the task analyzer ha s 
a built-in ability to f ind characteristic features of the task 
and to dete~mine the proper problem category! The information thus 
extracted is then channeled to the program provider . 
The program provider, corresponding to th e design engineer, 
has a collec tion of available instructions and programs which i s 
divided into two parts. One part is a permanent se t, a standard 
repertory, which contains basic instructions, sequences of instruc-
tions or open subroutines, and closed subroutines, each represented 
by a single name. The other is a t e mporary set consisting of 
records of previously constructed programs. The manner in which 
members of the temporary set are abstracted and generalized to be-
come members of the repertory represents an important kind of 
learning which will be discussed later. 
Using the information received from the task analyzer, the 
program provider constructs a tentative pro g ram by modifying a 
previously stored program, by constructing a program from basic 
in structions, or by assembing a new program from previously con-
structed programs, modified or unmodified. 
Items in the initially given r e pertory have their descriptions 
prestored, but the repertory c han ges as th e community unit learns; 
some members of th e repertory are combined to become one item; and 
some members of the t emporary set are abstracted and gene ra lized 
to be added to the repertory. Each time s uch a change takes place 
and each time the task analyzer rec ords a change in current state 
as the result of its interaction with th e exec utor-monit or dis-
cussed below, the description of the item involved mus t be reviewed 
and updated. 
The act~ providing functional descripti ons a nd improving 
them in the li ght~ experience is an important kind of learning 
which might be described as constructing and modifying a "cognitive 
map." It is the utilization of such a cognitive map which enables 
on e to internalize overt action, e.g., considering possible chess 
moves and, on the basis of information in the cogn iti ve map, int e r-
nall y determining what their consequences would be were th ey actu-
ally to be made. 
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The cognitive map of the pro gram provider contains functional 
descriptions of items in the repe rt ory; improvements in its cogni -
tiv e map mean improvement of its ability to select proper instruc-
tions and routines to construct a required pro gram. There are, 
however, co nsiderable d ifficulties in describing the function of 
every item in the repertory. In order to make the utilization 
of the cognitive map effective, ther e must be an efficient system 
for internal coding with reasonably uniform format. Our current 
attention is restricted to the type of description which can be 
put in the descriptive request form. 
Upon receivin g the tentative program constructed by the pro-
gram provider, the executor-monitor begins executing the gi ven 
program in one or a combination of th e following two modes. In 
normal, hi gh - speed execution of a sequence o f instructions, the 
executor-monitor transfers control to the address of the first 
instruction of the sequence. All instructions i n the sequence will 
be executed in high-speed and control will not be returned to the 
executor-monitor until the end of t he sequence is rea ched . This 
mode of exerution is identical t o that of th e conventional comput e r. 
The second mode is monitored execution. Instead of transferring 
control to the program location the executor - monitor interprets 
the execution of each i nstruction. This mode of execution n ot 
only permits the executor-monitor to retain c omplete control 
during execution but also to use info r~at ion on the ac ti on and 
the results of each instruction. Th u s it can detect a danger 
before any destructive ac ti on takes pl ace . 
The exec utor-monitor and the task analyzer are the only two 
parts of th e community unit with direct two-way communication. 
As the executor-monitor executes instructions, th e picture of the 
current state changes. Since the executor-monitor's function is 
essentially e xecution, however, and its immediate attention is 
give n only to the current instruct io n, it has no sense of dir ec -
tion toward the goal. This must be prov ided by feedback from the 
task analyzer. 
Let us review the original request provided in descriptive 
form. It is comprised of the original state, the desired state, 
and information on the task. The task analyzer stores a ll three 
as the r eco rd of the initial task, but it al so stores the current 
st a te, which is constantl y bei ng changed by the exec utor-monitor. 
The task ana l yz er, with the changed picture of the current state, 
will go throu gh the analysis of the changed task for each monitored 
operation. If the analysis shows the category of the changed task 
i s the same as before, the task analyzer will feedback to the 
executor-monitor a go - ahead signal so that the executor-monitor 
will pr oce ed to execute the next operation. If the analysis of the 
current state changes the category, the task analyzer will feed-
back to the executor-monitor an interruption signal and then trans-
fer control to the program provider with th e information about the 
new proble m ca tegory. Finally if the task a n alyzer is informed 
of a destructive operation which has been detected by the execu to r-
monitor, an analysis of the erro r wil l be made. The information 
will then be given to the program provider which will make an 
appropriate modification. 
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Another serious problem is to provide the mechanism with 
judgement capabilities comp a rable to "warmer" and "cooler" 
feelings of humans. Partial solution to thi_s problem ma y be 
possible with a combination of good planning techniques, recog-
nition of partial success, and good credit assigning methods for 
reinforcement. 
Some interesting analogies can be drawn betwe e n learning 
processes of the human and those of th e community unit. One 
is the development of high-speed performanc e foll owing sufficient 
monitored experience. When a sequence of actions with which we 
are familiar is first proposed (either by our teacher or by our-
selves) we consciously attend to each step of the sequence. How-
ever, on ce we gain familiarity and confidence, we run through a 
sequence of actions without being consciously awa re of each of 
its parts. 
Another similarity occurs in the progressive grouping of 
different elements into larger and lar ge r complexes. Suppose 
we have acquired skills in a number of simple tasks (e.g., some 
sequences of finger movements on a piano). When we att empt a more 
complex task which is an inte g rated sequence of those simpler 
skills, we have to attend to ea ch step of the sequence a lthough 
we need not attend to the full det ai l of each of the basic skills. 
Still another simil a rity betw e e n human and community unit 
experience is a tend en cy toward ab s t r a c tion as experience builds 
up. In many motor skills, we obser ve that some component skills 
are very specialized and fit ri g idly into a lar ge r pattern. Some 
component skills, however, when used in a situation calling for 
variations, can quickly be adapted. Of course, the opp os ite 
effect may be evidenced, i.e., previous acquisition of a skill 
may interfere with th e lear n ing of a new task. 
Hormann (1964, pp. 55-77) goes on two years later to discuss the 
internal mechanisms of an artificial int e lligence system: 
By planning as an aid to problem solving, we mean analyzing 
a given problem into a number of smaller subproblems. 
A planning mechanism which views, at an abstract level, a 
given task as a whole and th e n su gg ests possible divisions of it 
into a number of subtasks, each of which can be attached by a 
smaller search (or be further divided), is proposed for the system. 
Our planning mechanism is similar in structure to the commun-
ity unit. In fact, the planning mechanism uses, in addition to its 
own records, the same record in memory which the community unit 
uses. We again assume that request e d tasks are in descriptive form. 
Induction may be defined as the formulation of general rules 
about observed cases of a phenomenon and the application of these 
rules to the making of predictions. 
The inductive procedure observed in humans may be described 
in general terms: when a human wants to formula te general rules 
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about a class of phenomena, he first makes a guess to form a 
hypot hesis; next he deduces certain consequences of his hypothesis 
and t es ts them against new and old evidence in the hypothesis, 
modifies the hypothesis, or forms a new hypothesis and repeats 
the procedure. 
The first phase of any inductive process is performed by the 
task an alyzer of the induction mechanism . 
Usin g the information from the task analyzer, the conjecture 
generator, with the aid of its own subunit, produces programs 
which represent conjectures. 
We now examine what the subunit does in the case of the top 
line. Since the cyclic pattern is requested, the task analyzer 
of the subunit looks for the first r e current position of the first 
it em on the list "1213131" and finds it to be the third item. It 
now takes the first t wo items "12" as defining a cycle phase and 
asks the program provider to construct a program which will gener-
ate "121212 ... ". 
Interaction betw ee n the executor-monitor and t he task analyzer 
this time shows the results agree with the given sequence "1212121." 
The task analyzer now outputs the pro g ram to its higher-level pro-
gram, the conjecture gen erator with a "success" si gnal. As far as 
th e subunit is concerned, the task is successfully accomplished, 
althou gh the produced progra m is proved to be inadequate by the 
hi gher-level programs at the later s ta ge. 
The consequence generator, t o ;e ther with the task analyzer, 
step by step examines programs sup pl ied by the conjecture genera-
tor. The examination consists of monitored execution. Each i tem 
prop osed as a member o f the solution sequence is in turn prop o sed 
to the environment by a task analyzer as a prediction of t he next 
move needed to solve the four-disk case. 
The mechanical trainer, serving a s the environment of the mech-
anism first checks the legality of a suggested move by me ans of the 
le ga l move generator. If illegal, the information is fed back to 
the t a sk analyzer. If legal, the trainer compares it with its 
stored "knowled ge " of the puzzle, and feeds back information 
whether the move is right or wrong. 
After the complete sequ e nce o f correct moves becomes known 
to the task analyzer, the unmatched elements in th e su gge sted 
sequence and the correct-move sequence are then det e rmined and 
given to the conjecture generator. The conjecture generator 
modifies previously constructed pro g rams by parameterization, i.e., 
it replaces unmatched places with parameters. The resulting 
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Underlined parts represent cycle phases. Pi, P2, and P3 are 
names of sublists. Pi contains 3 and 4 , P2 contains A and B, and 
P3 contains Band C. The fact that 4 is used for the four-disk 
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puzzle is consiste nt with th e conjecture made earlier tha t success-
ful moves for th e fou r- d is k case must c on t ai n th e element 4. Up 
to this point, h oweve r, this c onjectur e has not been implemented . 
Our sys tem l ea rn s! Next ti me it i mmedi a tel y makes use of the 
correspondin g conjecture. When the f ive-dis k case is presente d , 
the t ask analyzer tentatively includes 5 a s one o f th e possible 
values of P1 . 
... Of course, th e s y stem itself will never know the fact un-
less told by the tr aine r. Howev e r , as the syste m gets more a n d 
more exper i ence with t he puzzle, a n d the conje ct ure (th e program) 
is used successfull ymorea nd more times, ut ili t y values of the 
conjec tu re in crease so that t he t ask analyzer will t e nd toward 
directing o r straightforward use of the pro gram. 
Man- mach in e rela ti onships 
Ideally, a c omputer-b a sed info rma tion r etrieval sys t em should 
place the full resources of a uni versal da t a bank a t the immediate 
disposal o f the library patron. This is the overall system objective 
which the computer promotes . The mor e specific objectives of the 
system are determined by the desires of t he li b r a ry pa tron. 
An i n forma ti on-re t rieval or automati c abstracting sys tem involve s 
t he processing of natur al la n guage messages. Garvin (196 3 , pp. 256 -
257) explains how an artificial intellige nce sys t em can accept 
natur a l lan gua ge messages t o retrieve informati on from library t ext : 
From th e point of view of a machine , library te x t con t ai n s 
only s trin gs o f words a nd punctuation. Hence, t his mac hine can 
accept search instructions f r om a hu man be in g only in t he form of 
recorded words, to ge ther with certain sp ec ific a ti ons as to 
combinations, sequences, punctuati on, an d f re quencies . (The 
machine may a l so be p r ovi d ed with a dictionary whic h can cont a in 
hu man-suppli ed codes for each word to re f lect semantic or gram-
matical information a bout that word.) Thus, any a tt emp t t o 
r etrieve i n forma tion dea l in g with " concepts" or "subjects" mus t 
somehow be for mula t ed in terms o f words and their combinations . 
Th e problems th a t arise in attem p ting to do so a re bes t explained 
with the he lp of a specific example. Le t us consider an informa-
tion r e quir emen t expressed as a qu es tion such a s: 
What factors a r e c riti cal ~ th e c ommerci al practicality of 
nu c le ar power? 
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To decide whether a document, an article , or a book deals 
with nuclear power is, in general, a highly intellectual task, not 
at all amenable to rigorous formulation as would be required in 
order to instruct a computer to perform such task. Let us start 
with a n aspect of this t ask which clearly is susceptible of mechan-
iz ation and which ought to p ro vide an approximate or partial solu-
tion to the problem. We hypothesize th a t any article dealing with 
nuclear power will probably contain the phrase nuclear power or 
some more or less synonymous equivalent of this phase, such as 
nuclear energy or reactor. The task of searching for a specified 
phrase is one that can be performed by a comput e r. The process 
of searching text for the occurrence of a particular word or a 
particular phrase is "machine-like" in nature. This phrase-
searching task is in sharp contrast to the non-precise, intellec-
tual, or nonmachine-like task of searching f o r material th at is in 
some way or another " relevant" to the subject o f nuclear power. 
Dattola (1969) explains that many methods exist for ordering or 
classifying the elements of a library file. He describes t he elements 
of such a file as being clustered into groups determined by the similar-
ities of the attributes of the elements . He views the elements a s docu -
ments in information retrieval, and the a ttributes as words relevant to 
the documents . He feels that the words describing a document can be 
. ~ought of as concepts associated with a document. 
Da ttola (1969) points out that documents are allowed to move 
freely from cluster to cluster within an artificial intelligence system 
until a nucleus is created within each cluster. He concludes that the 
nucleus will thu s consist of those documents which are most highly 
related to each other. He states that after a parti c ular nucleus is 
formed, the documents which are a part of it will not move from their 
present clusters. 
Garvin (1963) feels the basic problem associated with an automatic 
library system is the formulation of a mechanical method for identifying 
a class of documents which will satisfy an arbitrary request for infer-
mation. He suggests that the conventional approach to an au tomatic 
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librar y system employs inde x ta gs representing the content of every 
incoming document. He desc ribes index tags a s a shorthand repre s enta-
t ion of the content of corr esponding documents. He refers to the m as 
"ho oks" which the system uses to re trieve desired docu ments. 
McAllister and Bell (1971) believe that computer systems in the 
future will t end to rely more on efficient interaction with library 
patrons, working at on-line terminals . Library documents within a 
computer system can be identified by index ta gs , but a librar y patron 
must be able to identify the proper ind ex tag in or de r for the compu -
ter system to retrieve a relevent document. McAllister and Bell (1971) 
tell us that system designers and programmers s till know very little 
about what happens when a li brary pa tron sits down in front of a 
ter min al. They feel that research dealing wit h man-m ach ine communi-
cation is still very limited. 
Linderman (1967) states that the need for better understanding 
of the relations among inquirer, inquiry, and inde x in g method became 
more obvious as the possibilities of the use of mechanized methods for 
part of th e labor of information retrieval became apparent. Linderm a n 
(1967, p. 27) goe s on to state th a t if 
both the qu estion as originally posed and what was 
actually wanted were recorded, a most revealin g picture of the 
psychology of the inquirer and his interro ga tive habits might 
result. 
Doc umentalists have be gu n t o realize the importance of the 
re ference "interview" and the detailed analysis of what is wanted 
by the inquirer. The bar ricade to interpersonal communication set 
up by the computer has also star t ed the investigation of the input 
op era tion and indexin g procedures which can most eco no mica lly, as 
well as adequately, put into the compu t er store the information 
which hopefully, may sometime be retrieved by a future user. 
(Parenthetic ally , I should like to insert here that I am sure 
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that the "feedback" to the maker and reference sources from the 
th esauri being generated for computer use and from the studies of 
semantics, syntax, roles, links, and conventional systems, should 
be of considerable use to reference librarians of the future, 
whether o r not their services become mechanized). 
Henley (1970) explains that a ful l y operational real-time informa-
tion retrieval system can assist a library patron in his search for 
information, asking him for further classification where necessary, and 
consulting the librarian in cases of difficulty or ambiguity. 
Machine connnunication 
Bourne (1966, p. 21) tells us that words and concepts cannot be 
separ a ted as he states: 
... It is difficult even to think about any known concept 
without the immediate intrusion of its verbal asso c i a te(s) or 
description . Not only is it th e case that most conceptual 
groupings have meaningful verbal labels but also some concepts 
are learned and used a lmost exclusively in a verbal context ... 
This state of affairs has led at least one psychologist who has 
worked extensively in the area t o the c onclusion that concepts 
" ... are mea nin gf ul words which label classes of otherwise 
dissimilar stimuli." 
Arbib (1972, p. 208) discusses how humans developed lan guag e: 
... Let us speculate, in t his vein, on how humans might have 
"invent e d" language, and then discuss some experiments which help 
us understand th e functional capabilities the feat would have 
required. Initially, humans might have used conventional cries 
to draw attention to a single object, or to encourage the listener 
to undertake some particular action. It would then be natural to 
suggest an action with respect to a particular object a nd so 
concatenation - the ch a ining together of signals - could then 
evolve. Concatenating the t ypica l warning cry of the mother to 
her child with the signal for some forbidden action might then be 
th e basis for ne ga tion, and the first step toward lo g ic. Here 
th en is the beginning of lan guage as a means for communicating 
perceptions, and trying to share properties of internal models of 
the world. Where many linguists have taken syntax (the grammatical 
rules of the language) as primary to t he study of langua ge , we 
would see it as secondary in the evolution of l a n gua ge . If we did 
not understand the passive construction and registered only the 
74 
elementary meanings (semantics) of "apple", "eat", and "boy", our 
model of the world would lead us to underst and their co ncat enation 
as meaning what in English we convey by "the apple was eaten by 
the boy," rather th an "the apple ate the boy ." However, as we put 
more and more "s eman tic units" together, our model of th e world 
can no longer let us infer a unique relationship between . And 
thus we may hypothesize th a t syntax evolved as subtle modifiers 
became require d t o distinguish the possible meanin g of lon g 
concatenations of signs. 
Pars egian (19 73) views language as based on the experience of 
macroevents. He beli eves the experiences themse lves are the result of 
many microevents that are much too small to be observed individuall y . 
He gives as an example the ab ility of th e brain to identi fy readily 
analogous ge ometrical patterns and the impossibility of giving un amb i gu -
ous and complete verbal description of that simple visual faculty. 
Garvin (19 63) feels, th e n, that our t a sk is to develop a computer 
program which will gen e rate sentences in su ch a way a s to characterize 
certai n linguistic abil iti es and limit a t i ons of t he speaker of a given 
n atu ra l la n guage . He tells u s th a t a program of this sort must have 
the abi lity to construct and understand sentences n ever he ar d or 
uttered before in the life history of a n individual; it must have the 
capability to accept as grammatical or reject as ungrammatical a ny 
utterance. Further, he believes that a pro g ram with linguistic ability 
must be able to ascer tain in more than one way the presence of grammati -
cal ambiguity. 
Garvin (1963) contends that the ability of the comp uter to make 
routine yes/no decisions g iv e s it flexibility, permitting it to perform 
different processing oper a tions in relation to its previous r e sults. 
Garvi n (1963, p . 84) states: 
Before discussing artificial lan guages, and more sp e cifically 
computer lan g uages, let us briefly define machine lan gua ge . The 
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modern digital computer may be considered as a machine capable of 
carrying out a seque n ce of operations up on a set of data. The 
operations performed by the computer are determined by the fixed 
hardware, by a set of instructions, and by data th emselves. The 
operating compu t er may thus be sai d to obey a sequence of instru c-
tions that are programmed by the coder. Let us define a n admis-
sible instruction as par t of a set built into the computer by its 
designer. The execution of an admissible instruction is unambigu-
ously defined in terms of a sequence of events which take place 
within the machine. The total repertoire of admissible instruc-
tions forms a finite, precise vocabulary which may b e considered 
as a particular comp ut er language in t e rms of which the programmer 
can communicate with the machine. 
Newell and Simon (1961, p. 2016) describe a digital comp uter as a 
" general-purpose symbol -m anipulating device" : 
If appropriate programs are written for it, it can be made to 
produce symbolic output that can be compared with the stream of 
verbalizations of a human being who is thinking aloud while solving 
problems. The General Problem Solve r is a computer program that is 
capable of simulating, in the first approximatio n, h uma n behavior 
in a narrow but significant problem domain. 
Newell and Simon (1961, p. 2012) continue to explain that: 
The instructions that make up the computer program, like the 
data on which it operates, are symbolic expressions. But while the 
data are normally interpreted as numbers, the instructions are 
int erpreted as sequences of words--as sentences in the imperative 
mode. When the computer interprets the instruction "add A to B," 
it produces the same result that a person would produce if he were 
asked in English to "add the number labeled A to the number labeled 
B. Tl 
Parsegian (1973) explains that codes such as binary notation a r e 
capable of reducing numbers, letters of the alphabet , and even instruc-
tions to symbols that consist of a series of two signs , representing 
the "off" and the " on " condition. He further explains that a message 
made up of such symbols can then be "written," or punched, or given 
magnetic representation, on cards or on magnetic tapes. 
Newell and Simon (1961) view a computer as more than a number-
manipulating device . They feel that th e symbols it manipulates may 
represent numbers, letters, words, or even non-numerical, nonverbal 
patterns. They state that a computer has general capabilities for 
reading symbols, storing symbols in memory, copying symbols from one 
memory location to another, erasing symbols, comparing symbols for 
identity, and detecting spe c ific differences between their patterns. 
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Garvin (1963) points out that natural languages play a role 
entirely different from that of computer languages. He explains that 
computer languages are used to formulate ins tr uctions; it is inconceiv-
able that the natura l languages could be used for that purpose. He 
concludes that the vagueness and ambi guity o f natural lan guages 
preclude their use for addressing the computer directly. He suggests 
that natural languages shoul d appear instead as data which must be 
translated, abstracted, sort ed , and so on. Garvin (1963, p. 96) 
describes the typical steps in the computer processing of natural 
langua g e: 
In accordance with the procedural plan initially fed into 
the computer, it can direct itself through these typical st e ps 
in the processing of natural language: 
Readin g in a batch of runnin g text in natur a l order. 
Forming word records for the bat c h of text. 
Sorting word records alphabetically. 
Calling up dictionar y records from a file stored on magnetic 
tape. 
Collating or mer g in g the word records with the dictionar y 
records. 
text. 
Removing dictionary records not matched by word records. 
Re-s o rti n g a mer ged file into the original text order. 
Repeatin g the same proc e ssing cycle for the next batch of 
Hunt et al . (1966, p. 3) describe an in t elligent device as 
"something capable of adjusting to its environment." 
... To mak e such adjustments the device must continuously be 
classi f ying sli ghtly different states of the environment as equiva-
lent or not equivalent. The particular classifica ti ons may vary 
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from time to time: sometimes we group whales with sharks. Still, 
the intelligent device must classify. Now suppose that we wish 
to de s ign such a device. Unless we, the designers, know al l the 
states of the environment which the device may encounter, we have 
no way of prewiring it with a capaci ty to develop classification 
rules from experience. We shall refer to such develop ment as 
concept learning, and a device that can perform this act will be 
called a concept learning system. 
Hunt (1962, p. 72) concludes that "concepts can be learned via 
symbols at progressively more and more abstract levels." He further 
support s the notion that concept learning is equated to the learning 
of names. He describes a name as a symbol used to refer to a set. He 
feels that in a natural langua ge such as English it is easier to 
equate names with nouns. He contends that the idea of a name is more 
genera l than this; any phrase or descriptive sentence could also be 
assigned a symbol, and this would be its name. 
Hunt (1962, p. 29) stat e s: 
Church (1958) reasoned that a name has two properties, its 
meaning or concept and its denotation .... Church's de finition 
of conc e pt and denotation can be expressed usin g the set-theoretic 
definition of description. The denotation of a name related it to 
particular elements in the universe of objects; the concept of a 
name relates it to a description of the objects. Specifically, the 
denotation of the name is the subset of the universe consisting of 
all objects to which the name can be applied. 
We have noted earlier that the capacity for forming and dealing 
with abstract concepts seems to arise from language and the use of 
words symbolically to represent a n d to communicate ideas. Bourne 
(1966) describes words as "responses which have been associated with 
states of the world:" 
When multiple associations between a response and se vera l 
dissimilar stirnuli--exist for a subject, the word is a label for 
a concept and can be used symbolically. Insofar as these 
associations are the same for two or mor e people, the word may 
function as a sign in communication. lfuen verbal labels do not 
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exist, either because the concept is arbitrary and unn a tural or 
because the stimulus attributes do not lend th emselves easily to 
v e r bal associations, the subject may have difficulty describing 
the basis fo r his category responses. This mer e l y shows that words 
and concepts are independent, though often tied in natural circum-
stances. 
Hunt (1962, p. 13) believes that "no natur a l (i.e., spoken) lan-
guage is completely unambiguous. The closest app ro xima tion to an 
unambi guous language is the notation o f symbolic logic. Although no 
presently speakable language is based on formal logic , we can conceive 
of thou gh ts as statements in symbolic logic." Hunt (1962, p. 16) 
continues: 
The notation of symbolic logic is a particularly appropriate 
language for describing complex mental processes. We can ass i gn 
symbols to represent all our p r imi tiv e undefined ideas. Once 
this is done for a particular problem, we h ave clear and unambigu-
ous rules concerning the manipulati on of these symbols into gram -
mati cally correct sentences .... recent advances in computer 
technology have provided us with an automatic device for manipu-
lating the formulas of symbolic logic. This has changed the status 
of symbolic logic from a theoret ically possible to a practically 
feasible tool for theory construction. 
List processing is a method which can be used to store data 
symbolically representing the elements of a natur a l language. Hunt 
(1962, 210) describes list processing: 
In list processing, data is stored in a rather different 
manner than it is in conventional programming. The distinction 
between data and s tored program th a t is usually found in numeri cal 
analysis disappears. Everything, includin g the program itse lf, is 
stored as a list. The pro gram list can be treated a s a piece of 
data by other pro g r ams, including its own s ub ro u tines. This g ives 
th e program a capability for modifying its elf , providing that the 
programmer specifies how such modifications are to take place. 
The principle difference between list processing and nonnal 
pro grammin g is in the method used to refer to items in memory. 
Di gita l computers refer directly to the location of a symbol. In 
list processing symbols are stored on lists of symbols. The name 
of the list is the name of the location of the "head", or first 
s ymbol on the list. As part of its contents this cell contains 
the address of the cell that contains the first symbol on the 
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list. The cell containin g this symbol also contains the address 
of the cell containing the second symbol, etc., until the cell 
containing the last symbol on a list is reached. In this cell the 
"next location" is replaced by a list termination symbol. The head 
cell may contain a symbol that is the name of an associated list, 
or its contents may represent other information. Since the name 
of a list is a symbol, and may be stored in the head or body of 
other lists, a complex list structure, or cross referencing system 
between lists can be developed. Information is found by searching 
lists until the required symbols are found. Several entries may 
be provided to a single piece of information by placing a symbol on 
more than one list. Symbols can be reached indirectly by locating 
other symbols known to be associated with them. 
Another advantage of list processin g is that it can oe used 
to pr o gram a computer for recursive computations .... What we are 
concerned with is the idea of a recursive operation, since such 
operations are quite important in artificial intelligence research. 
A recursive operation is one in which the function being com-
puted contains itself as a subfunction. This means that the origi-
nal function must, if it is to be nontrivial, contain three sepa-
rate types of functions; test functions, argument generating func-
tions, and value computing functions. 
By convention, data can be stored on two types of lists. A 
description list is a list that is attached to another list to 
specify information ab out it. Ther e is a close parallel between 
description lists and the idea of de scriptions of objects. Descrip-
tion li sts have dimensions (called a ttributes) a nd values. The 
description li st alternates symbols which specify the type of 
information (attributes) and symbols which specify the information 
its e lf (values). Thus, as a value, an identical symbol may mean 
different things depending on the attribute with which it is 
associated. As an example, think of the different connotations of 
"red" as the name of a color of a traffic light and as the name of 
a political belief. Since value can be the names of lists, the 
attribute of a particular symbol may be used to provide entry to 
an extensive structure of information. In addition, description 
lists may, themselves, have description lists. A compounding of 
li s ts in any manner is called a list structure. The name of the 
list structure is the name of the list which provides the highest-
order entry po int in all lists. By "highest order" we mean that by 
entering this list, a path can be traced, via sublists, to any 
point in the structure. 
Garvin (1963) believes that research into natural language program-
ming will create a sophisticated form of communication between man and 
machine. George (1970) explains that linguistic analysis is an 
inductive process in that it attempts to formulate a listing of elements 
and a set of statements from the examination of written and spoken 
80 
language. He feels it is based on the hypothesis that in both of these 
sour c es of data, it is possible to derive re gularly recurrent elements 
of different types and orders of complexity. Garvin (1963) concludes 
that the classification of these elements and the statement of their 
c onditions of distribution resulting from this analysis is then con-
sidered to constitute an inductive description of language. He explains 
that the characteristic of the computer such as its self-sequenci n g 
ability, hi gh speed, ability to perfor m routine decisions, ability to 
receive a n d transmit inform a tion in a variety of media a nd formats, 
ability to select a nd retrieve stored inform a tion at high speed, and 
its multipurpose adaptabilit y give it many important implications for 
natural-language-data proc e ssing. 
Henley (1970) feels that from the users point of view, what is 
required is something which he finds easy a nd natural. He concludes 
that the only thin g which qu a lifies is some form of English. The 
possibility of natural lan guag e input to the system must receive strong 
consideration. 
Stone et al. (1962, p. 484) des c ribe the General Inquirer system: 
The General Inquirer system can be considered to have three 
main aspects: 
1. Dictionary lookup. In order to ask about the appearance 
o f a membe r of a p a rticular category of words in a sentence, it is 
necessary first to look up all the words appearing in the t ext and 
tag ea c h one with subscripts naming all the categories the investi-
gator deems appropriate. 
2. Question forma t. After the text has been tagged, a simple 
but flexible method of writing questions is used to specify the 
conditions under which a sentence should be counted or r etrieved. 
Up to a hundred different questions may be considered a t once, 
each quest i on bringing back a separate coun t of the sentences 
retrieved and a listing of those sentences under its own heading . 
For e fficiency, questions are grouped into sets wi th "l ead in g 
probes" to determine first of all if the sentence satisfies the 
basic requirements of the entire set . 
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3. Syntax identification. Syntax problems are handled by 
providing a few simple marking rules for both preparing the origi-
nal sentences on IBM cards and for writing the questions. If the 
investigator does not want to write syntax-specific questions, 
such markings may be omitted. 
Th e General Inquirer system is written in C0MIT, a higher 
or der c omputer l a nguage especially developed for processing 
written text materials. C0MIT was develope d by the Mechanical 
Translation Group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and operates on the IBM 7090. 
Tirsch (1964) believes that we must first try to decide what it is 
about the English language that can be described to a computer. He 
describes the English lan guage as consis t ing of certain units and a 
set of allowable arrangements of these units. He states that our 
informally-def i ne c: unit will be called the "word." He feels that 
using this vague unit, we may consider the "word" to be the basic unit 
of English. He concludes that having done this, we are able to take 
the syntactical investigation of the properties of the English language 
to be an investig a tion into the allowabl e arrangements in the text 
of English "words." 
Garvin (1963) tells us that one aim of linguistic science is to 
construct general rules capable of generating indefinitely many of the 
sentences of a language, and to predict that sentences never previously 
uttered will be characterized by the same set of generalizations. He 
concludes that we must ultimately determine the systematic properties 
of human language in their most gen e ral terms. 
Garvin (1963, p. 212) describes an automatic system for gramm a tical 
a n alysis: 
An automatic system for gramma tic al analysis is usually 
conceived as working its way upward from level to level. First 
morphological a nalysis is carried out in accordance with morpho-
logical cri t eria (and lower-level criteria as well; similarity of 
sound or spelling is used in deciding whether two forms are forms 
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of the same word). Next syntactic analysis is carried out, using 
morpholo g ical and syntactic c riteria. Then semantic analysis, 
using semantic and syntactic criteria, is performed. How far the 
sequ ence o f leve l s continue s is still an open question, but the 
proposed a utomatic a nalysis pro g r ams pass from level to level in 
one direction only . 
Garvin (1963) tells u s that a finite set of rules which enumerates 
an indefinitely large number of grammatical sentences in a lan guage 
is called a generative grammar. He feels that unlike other forms of 
grammar, generative grammar does not give the re ade r an opport unity to 
co nstruct new sentences based on the "analogy" of those that a r e cited 
and analyzed. He explains that transformational grammar is a gene rative 
grammar; it is a grammar which attempts to produce all the sentences of 
a language to include all possible sentences as well as the ones actu -
ally recorded. He concludes th a t an ad eq uate gram mar of English should 
en ab le a person to produce not just thos e sentences that have been said 
in the past, but all the sentences th at a native speaker is capable of 
creating or understandin g . 
Liles (1971, p. 8 ) describes transformational grammar: 
In some respects transformational gramma r is si milar to 
traditional grammar . Transformational grammar assi gns each 
sentence an underlyin g structure that is called a fteep s tructure. 
Some traditional gramma rs used a similar concept in spea k in g of 
"understood" elements . For example , they said that Torn is taller 
than! has the underlying form Tom is taller th an! am tall and 
tha t imperative sent e nces such a s Come h e re have an understood 
subject you. Transformational g rammarians agree, but apply this 
idea of underlying structure to every sentence and express it in 
a more a bstract form than tr adi tional g rammarians did. 
Liles (1971, p. 30) describes transformational grammar as be ing 
organized into three sections or components ; 
1. The syntactic component contains the phrase-structure an d 
transformational rules and provides the structure of the sentence. 
2. The semantic component on the P-terminal string after en-
tries from the lexicon have be e n added and gives the sentence its 
meaning. 
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3. The pholological component operates on the sentence after 
all transformations have been applied and gives the sentence its 
final form . 
Liles (1971, p . 43) concludes that phrase-structure rules can pro -
duce the structures un derlying sentences: 
The phrase-structure rules can produce the structures of such 
sentences as These boys might have been swimmin g in the l ake and 
The manager wrote~ letter. They cannot produce such structures 
as th e following : 
1. The manager didn't write a letter. 
2. Did the manager write a letter? 
3. Who wrote a letter? 
4. 1.-fuat did the manager write? 
5. A letter was written by the manager. 
6. Because the manager wrote a le t ter 
7. Th e letter that was written by the manager 
8. The letter written by the manager .. . 
9. For the manager to write a letter .. . 
10. The man age r' s having written a letter 
All of these structures se em to be r elated in some way to the 
manager wrote~ letter. The same relatio nshi ps are found in all 
of them: the manager is the one who performed the act of writin g , 
and a letter is the result of this action. In spite of the dif -
ferences in form, there is a similarity in meaning in a ll th e 
structures. Transformational r ules are used to produce these 
changes in form. 
Liles (1971, p. 12) further believes th a t "in addition to rules 
that generate the sentences of English, we also h ave a means o f repre-
senting the exact choices that are made in the derivation of specific 
sentences." He calls this rep resen t ation a "tree." Liles gives as an 
example the following sentence: 
"Yes, that man drinks milk." 
Liles follows this example by stating: 
Senten ces in English are not composed of mere sequences of 
words; rather, ... they are composed of words that cluster 
to ge ther often in complex hierarchies. In the above sentence, 
that man drinks milk is one c luster which in turn is composed o f 
two subordi nate clusters: that man and drinks milk. Notice that 
the tree (Fi gure 4) shows this ar .rangement. 
Sentence 
Sentence modifier 
Noun phrase Verb phrase 
that man drinks milk 
Yes 
Figure 4. Transformational "tre e ." 
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Liles (1971) concludes that transformation is a process which c on -
verts deep structur e s into surface structures. He continues to explain 
that because transformations a ffect form, two surface structures may be 
different but share the same deep structure . Liles (1971, p. 67) 
states: 
••• On the surface, She read me ~ story and She read~ story~ 
me ar e diff ere nt. but the native s peaker o f En g lish understands t hem to mean the same thing. Our gramma r shows how the sentences are 
related by s a ying th a t they have the sam e deep structure but th at 
th e optimal indirect object transformation has been applied t o the 
structure of th e first sentence but not to th at of the second. 
Lil e s ( 1 971, p. 99) concludes th at "surface structures are often 
structurall y ambiguous; de e p structures never a r e." 
Garvin (1963) tells us that we can now see what the grammatical 
part of a machine-translation system must do. He feels that using 
the indic a to r s of a natura l language such as syntactic types, occur-
renc e o rder, and punctuation in conjunction with tr a nsformational rules, 
the syst em must determine the structur e of each input sentence. He 
beli eves that g iven the structure of a sentence, the system must find 
d e vices in the output language with which to indicate that structure. 
He concludes that on the input side, there may be ambiguities; sentence-
structure determination can end with more than one possible interpre-
tation o f a given sentence. He contends that synt a ctic analysis through 
the use of transformational rules can reduce thi s ambiguity in most 
cases. 
Salton (1970, p. 338) describes the SMART system: 
... The SMART system is a n experimental, fully automatic 
document retrieval system, operating with an IBM 7094 and a 360 
165 co mputer. Unlike most other computer-based retrieval systems, 
the SMART system does no t rely on manua lly assigne d keywords or 
index terms for the identification of documents and search 
request s , nor do es it use primarily the frequency of occurrence 
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of certain words or phrases includ ed in the texts of documents. 
Instead, an attempt is made to go beyond simple word-matching 
procedures by using various intellectual aids in the form of 
synon ym dictionaries, hierarchical arrangements of subject identi-
fiers, statistical and syntactic phrase-generation methods, and 
the like, in order to obtain the content identifications useful 
for the retrieval process. 
Summary 
Henley (1970, pp. 3-4) describes a computer as a collection of 
"machinery or hardware" consisting of four elements. He goes on to 
state that ''ther e is the store, or main memory, of the computer which 
holds items of information for as long as they a re needed; a second com-
ponent is the control unit, which examines the instructions con tained 
in the program, and sends out the electronic signals which instigate the 
required operations; thirdly, there are the arithmetic and character-
handling units, which perform the requested operations on items con-
tained in the main store; fourthly, there are a number of input/output 
devices controlled by device control units, by means of which informa-
tion . is communicated to and from main store." 
Hunt (1962) explains that a list of computer instructions taken 
as a whole is called a program. Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963) consider 
the instruction to "compare and transfer control" very important because 
it enables the computer to make a simple two-choice decision - to take 
one of two specified courses of action depending on the information 
found in the same cell of the memory. By cascading these simple deci-
sions, highly complex decisions could be fashioned. 
Kucera (1969) describes a computer as much more th an a machine per-
forming calculations . He believes that aside from their mathematical 
operations, computers can process, organize, compare, and manipulate 
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data of a non-numerical nature including textual information. He con-
cludes that it is this capacity of computers to deal with letters, words, 
sentences, or even whole texts that has made them of considerable 
importance in the study of language. 
Hunt (1962) tells us that mechanical concept learners can be 
viewed in the same manner as biological concept learners which acquire 
cate gorizations based on an internal representation of an external 
object. He believes that categorization in concept learning involves 
the manipulation of coded symbols representing the objects to be cate-
gorized. Hunt et al. (1966) describe concept learning as a hierarchial 
process - an organism must have a concept in order to learn more con-
cepts. It follows then that any value of an attribute is itself a con-
cept, and when we speak of concept learning devices, we are talkin g 
about devices which discover rules for combining previously learned 
concepts to form a new decision rule. 
Shepard (1964) views the problem-solving ability of an organism 
as dependent in considerable measure upon the association structure of 
its memory and the consequent efficiency with which it is able to 
retrieve from memory that which is most relevant to a given situation. 
He points out that such associative connections which are not yet 
built into the hardware of modern computers is implemented in 
programming systems such as IPL and LISP. He states that these pro-
grams provide for the symbolic linking of each newly-stored item of 
information to any previously-stored items so as to form lists or 
"trees." 
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Hunt (1962) implies that problem-solving for an artificial intel-
li gence system could consist of the application of "TOTE units." He 
describes a TOTE unit as a test to det e rmine the difference between 
current knowled ge and th e desired state, operating t o reduce these 
differences, and then testin g again. He believes this type of cogni-
tive psychology makes a strange appeal to the computer program as a 
model. A computer can be programmed to test data, to operate to reduce 
differences, and then to retest. 
Linderman (1967) is convinced that the real problem is developing 
computer programs that not only or ga nize information by subject but 
also are capable of lo g ically reorganizing stored information in order 
to respond to th e c hangin g ne eds of library users. She feels the ulti-
mate objective would be to extract underly i ng patterns of meaning from 
a complex information networ k . She believ es the developments in pro-
gramming suggest th at a practical ne ed will be felt more acutely in 
the future for a well-founded mathematical method of executing induc-
tive inference, including hypotheses testing. She concludes that an 
artificial intelli gen ce system would have to perform the entire induc-
tive process, including the so-called "creative" work which is often 
consider e d a necessary ingredient of inductive inf e rence. 
Ideally, a computer-based information retrieval system should 
place the full resources of a universal data bank at the immediate 
disposal of the library patron. This is th e overall system objective 
which the computer promotes. The more specific objectives of the sys-
tem are determined by the desires of the library patron. 
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Dattola (1969) explains that many methods exist for ordering or 
classifying the elements of a library file. He describes the elements 
of such a file as being clustered into groups determined by the 
similarities of the attributes of the elements. He views the elements 
as documents in information retrieval, and the attributes as words 
relevant to the documents. He feels that the words describing a docu-
ment can be thought of as concepts associated with a document. 
Bourne (1966) tells us that words and concepts cannot be separated. 
Newell and Simon (1961) view a computer as more than a number-
manipulating device. They feel that the symbols it manipulates may 
represent words or concepts. 
Hunt (1962, p. 72) concludes that ''concepts can be learned via 
symbols at progressively more and more a b stract levels." He further 
supports the notion that concept learning is equated to the learning of 
names; a name is a symbol used to refer to a set. He feels that in a 
natural language such as English it is easiest to equate names with 
nouns. He contends that the idea of a name is more general than this; 
any phrase or descriptive sentence could also be assigned a symbol, 
and this would be its name. 
Garvin (1963) points out that the vagueness and ambiguity of 
natural languages preclude their use for addressing the computer 
directly. He suggests that natural languages should appear instead as 
data which must be translat ed, abstracted , sorted, and so on. 
Hunt (1962) believes the closest approximation to an unambiguous 
lan gua ge is the notation of symbolic language. List processing is a 
method which can be used to store data symbolically representing the 
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elements of a natural language. Garvin (1963) feels that the character-
istics of the computer, such as its self-sequencing ability, high speed, 
ability to perform routine decisions, ability to receive and transmit 
information in a variety of media and formats, ability to select and 
retrieve stored information at high speed, and its multi-purpose 
adaptability give it many important implications for natural-language-
data processing. 
Garvin (1963) tells us that using the indicators of a natural 
langua ge such as syntactic types, occurrence order, and punctuation in 
con j unction with transformational rules, an artificial intelligence 
system must determine the structure of each input sentence. He further 
believes that given the stru c ture of a sentence, the system must find 
devices in the output lan gua ge with which to indicate that structure. 
He concludes that on the inp ut side, there may be ambiguities; sentence 
structure d e termination can e nd with more than one possible interpre-
tation of a given sentence. He contends that syntactic analysis through 




COMPUTERIZATION OF REFERENCE SERVICE 
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Katz (1969) tells us that a reference interview situation exists 
where a library patron is not certain what he wants or where there is 
a problem as to exactly what kind of information he needs. A computer-
based information retrieval system just like a reference librarian 
must constantly be drivin g to clarify the question and to match it 
with the information source. 
Katz (1969, p. 53) presents the steps a reference librarian and 
indeed an artificial intelligence system must fo llow to clarify a 
reference question: 
1. Purpose. Classify the question in terms of purpose. 
This appears simple enough, but it is not always easy or 
advisable to ask a patron why he wants a particular answer. 
Frequently the librarian must ask himself what would the patron 
do with the answer if he h a d it. In many cases the purpose may 
be relatively apparent. The age, education, the experience, or 
even the sex of the user may indicate purpose. 
2. Scope. Classify the question in terms of scope. How 
much material is required to answer the query - an encyclopedia 
article, a magazine article, a book, several books, or what? 
Scope will depend upon the need of the patron and the difficulty 
of the question. 
3. Time. Classify the question in terms of time. Is this 
a current or a historical topic? If it is a current topic, what 
are the limits on the age of the materials in which the answer 
may be found - one month, one year, or several years? 
4. Key words. Classify the question in terms of descriptive 
expressions or key words. Have the terms been encountered before? 
The librarian should not hesitate to confess that he does not 
really know what the terms mean . 
5. Subject. Classify the question in terms of subject. 
the majority of questions clearly i n dicate what the subject 
is . ... The essential problem with subject is a mat ter of scope. 
How much material is required, a t what level , and in what spec i fic 
area of the larger subject? 
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6. Need for "bridge." Classify the question in terms of 
whether it requires a "bridge" in the form of an index or biblio-
graphy, or simply one or two reference works that contain the 
answer. . .. The fact question, "What are the dimensions of the 
moon?" can be readily answered in an almanac, an encyclopedia, or 
some other reference book specifically geared to astronomy. Once 
the distinction between the "fact" and the "bridge" type of ques-
tion is clear, it is primarily a matter of knowing the broad 
sources and then narrowing them as rapidly as possible. 
7. Form. Classi f y the question in terms of form. Most 
patrons have an idea of the form in which they expect the answer 
--a book, chart, map, picture, etc .... A major problem here is 
that when a patron knows he wants an exact reproduction of an item, 
that particular item cannot be found through the c a r d catalog 
because it is part of a larger unit. For example, the user who 
wants a specific poem rarely can find it through the catalog but 
must resort to an index of poetry. 
8. Language. Classify the question in terms of language. 
Can the user read more th a n one l ang uage? ... Another aspect of 
language is the level of reading comprehension. The specialist 
will require one approach, the layman quite another, and the young 
student still a third. 
9. Availability of material. Classify the question in terms 
of availability. Is the material to answer the query in the 
library? If not, can it be retrieved quickly f rom another library? 
Is the patron willing to wait, and f or how long, for the answer 
from another source? 
Henley (1970, p. 17) is convinced that user-orientation or open-
ness to his needs must receive hi gh priority in the design of a 
computerized information retrieval system: 
Apart from the lending library type of function, three 
separate requirements may be discussed, connected with three 
different types of library user. They are: 
1. Browsing. The user who has no specific information or 
document in mind, and merely wants to look around for someth i ng 
of interest. 
2. Information retri eval . The user who has an occasional 
or periodic need for specific information or documents of one 
kind or another. 
3. Regular notification. The user who expects to be informed 
of recent literature in his own particular field. 
West (1975) contends that the education of librarians to become 
"information intermediaries" is an immediate and difficult problem. 
She feels that this problem goes beyond teaching librarians how to 
initiate commands on a computer terminal. She believes the basic 
problem is teaching librarians how to approach information per se . 
West (1975, p. 276) explains this basic problem: 
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... The traditi onal reference method in a public or academic 
library is to respond to a question by supplying an answer from a 
"reference book." Further effort in the academic library is 
directed toward educating the patron to us e the tools; the a rduous 
literature search on behalf of the user takes place only in the 
special library or information center. In effect, reference 
librarians must be retrained as special librarians - accustomed to 
structuring search, employing a variety of search strategies, and 
being familiar with a large number of data bases in various sub-
ject fields. 
This retraining may take place in a variety of ways: formal 
course work in a library school en vironm ent, workshops or insti-
tutes sponsJred by professional associations, in-service training 
sessions in the libraries themselves. In whatever form, it is 
essential if libraries are to s urvive as information suppliers 
and not be forced to retreat to the role of mere information 
warehouses. One of the statements of the National Commission on 
Libraries and Information Science with which we can certainly 
agree is that "It is essential ... th a t all librarians understand 
the potentials of new technologies, and this is especially true 
for th ose librarians who serve the user directly." 
Advanced computer models 
Meredith (1971) des c ribes REFSEARCH as a machine-a ssisted approach 
system which attempts to bring the library patron to a position from 
which he can take the final step to retrieving the information he is 
seeking. REFSEARCH is based on the assumption that every reference 
question has a "h andle " or specific noun central to the sense of the 
question and indexable somewhere in the general reference collection. It 
translates the handle to some category that fits the notion of the kinds 
of things indexes are about. The library patron must translate his in-
formation needs into handles which are suitable for use as categorical 
terms controlling specific approaches to data. Meredith (1971, p. 177) 
94 
chose the following handl e s or categories as th e most appropriate for 


















Meredith (1971) states that the next step in developing these 
access categories was to divide or qualify them in such a way that they 
could be narrowed to correspond more closely with th e information needs 
implied in a query. Victor Hugo, for example, would be categorized as 
a PERSON (c ategory) , then as DEAD (qualified), REAL (qualifier), PROPER-
NAMED (qualifier), and an INDIVIDUAL (qualifier), thereby acquiring 
subject specification that would be accommodated quite well by some 
reference works and not by others. From this point, REFSEARCH would 
provide the library patron with a list of reference works most closely 
matching the sub ject specification of his query. 
The Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) employs the 
Boolean search technique to sort out only those citations which satisfy 
the needs of a particular research problem . The Boolean search te ch -
nique is important to us as an example of a computer program which 
sorts "sets" of i nf ormation on a given subject and then combines these 
95 
sets to retri eve relevant publication citations. Brown (1975, pp. 17-
18) describes in detail an ERIC computer search: 
In order to have an effective computer search performed, you 
should be familiar with some of the basic components of the pro-
cess. The first component is the "search strategy"--the statement 
of the research problem formulated in terms that the computer is 
able to recognize and deal with. In the ERIC system the problem 
must be translated into ERIC descriptors and set up using a Boolean 
search technique. 
A Boolean search technique allows the computer to sort out 
only those citations which satisfy the needs of the particular 
resear c h problem. In order to accomplish this sorting, the com-
puter is instructed to establish "sets" of information on a given 
subje c t a nd then to combine those sets to retrieve the relevant 
items. Drawn below is a "Venn diagram" co nsistin g of three 
overlappin g circles. We can visualize these circles as sets of 
information about a given subject. Circle A might contain cita-
tions about educational films; Circle B, information about second-
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By looking a t the diagram it becomes obvious that information 
about using instru ctio n a l fil ms a t the secondary le ve l would be 
contain ed in t he area marked E + G. Information a bout using in-
structional films with Spanish sp ea king in div idu al s would be found 
in a rea marked D + G; a nd information about usin g instructional 
films with Spanish speaking students a t the se con dary level would 
b e found in the area marked G. It is also obvious from the d ia-
gram that the more narrowly define d the topic, the smaller the 
number of items in the se t . Each rep o rt in such a narro wly de f ined 
s et should be hi gh ly rele va nt. 
With this background it is easy to see that you must be very 
cl ear about the information needed to an swer the question. The 
se a rch analyst who conducts the search for you will probabl y ask 
qu est ions or have a form that is designed to e licit informat io n 
th a t can be tran sla ted into a Boolean search formul a . Typic al 
questions a re: 
What age or school level will y ou be de ali n g with? 
Wha t med i a or teachin g method are you interested in? 
What type of document (journal article, conference r epor t, 
curriculum g ui de) are you most likely t o ne ed? 
Oth er ques tions may be designed to find out wheth e r yo u desire 
broad ge neral coverage of th e topic wi th th e possibility of retriev-
in g some irrelevant in forma tion, or a ti ght ly defined cove ra ge with 
th e possib il ity of miss i n g a few r eleva nt ite ms. 
Information science 
She r a ( 1972, p . 789) cites Harold Borko's description of info r ma-
ti on science. Harold Barko sees in information science a true discip-
lin e 
... th at investigates the properties a nd beh av ior of infor ma-
tion, the forces gove rnin g the flow of information, and the means 
for pr ocessi n g inf ormatio n for optimal access ibility and usability . 
It is concerned with the body of kno wledg e relating to the 
ori g in a ti on , collection, organization, storage, r e tri eva l, 
interpr etat ion, tran smi ssio n , tr a nsf orma ti on , and utilization of 
in for ma tion. This includ es the investi ga tion of inf o rma tion repre-
sent ations in both natural and art ifici al syst ems , the use o f 
codes for efficient mess age transmission, and the stud y of infor-
mation proc ess in g devices a nd t ec hniques such a s computers and 
their programming systems. 
He furth e r maint a ins t hat inf o rmation scie n ce is interdis ci plin a ry 
in that it derives from a nd relates to such fields as ma thematics, lo gic, 
lin guistics, psycholo gy, c omputer technology, operations research, 
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the graphic arts, library science, management, "and similar fields ." 
Shera (1972, p. 789) further contends that 
... information science is an area of study and research 
which draws its substance, methods, and techniques from a variety 
of disciplines to achieve an understanding of the properties, 
behavior, and flow of information. It includes systems analysis , 
environmental aspects of information and communication information 
media and language analysis , o r ganization of information, man-
systems relationships and the like." Thus [we] ar rive at a defi-
nition of information science as the "investigation of communica tion, 
phenomena and the properties of communication systems." Such a 
definition which has the virtue of brevi t y and sharpness, would 
seem to be the most satisfactory of a n y yet devised, provided it 
is understood that by "communication" is meant the trans fer of any 
kind of knowledge through any medium or environment . 
Linderman (1967, p. 161) concludes that "since information is by 
definition something that is or can be put into linguistic form, there 
is a presumption that computers will someday take over the job of 
receiving, assembling, analyzing and inferrin g from it." 
Systems design 
Linderman (1967, p. 177) believes that an "important current 
development for the future of ref e rence work has been the introduction 
of systems thinking into library procedures work. " Linderman (1967, 
p. 183) continues: 
Systems thinking - with its new formulation of problems, 
its choice of more appropriate objectives, its hope for ingenuity 
in inventing new systems, and its recognition of the principle 
that library procedures are basically information processes -
opens up whole new areas of thought about libraries. Perhaps 
the most important concomitant of systems thinkin g will be the 
increasing comprehensiveness of library systems which alone 
stimulates a whole new intellectual approach to library problems . 
... However, were it not for the advent of the computer, it would 
not be possible to do much systems activation, for it is the com-
put er which will enable librarians to manipulate information in 
library systems. 
Warheit (1970, p. 74) suggests that "from a practical point of 
view, one can develop and implement only one application at a time . 
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... It is necessary, therefore, to develop single applications and to 
design them in such a way that they can become of an integrated system." 
Warheit (1970, p. 76) further states: 
With knowledge of how he wants his system to develop, the 
librarian is now able to establish priorities a nd allocate his 
resources. The emphasis will be on file building, on capturing 
the record. Acquisitions programs or circulation control systems 
will come first. Work on the display terminal a nd communication 
will come later after searchable files hav e been built up. 
Henley (1970, p. 72) feels that "real-time brings all the techniques 
necessary for an efficient retrieval system almost within the bounds of 
practicability, at the expense of a new burden of programming which the 
computer specialist must accept." He further states: 
System design in libraries may be as complex as it is 
anywhere else. The ideal should be an efficient, easy to use 
document analysis and retrieval system, with ample media for user 
contact, participation and feed-back ; computer conversations, with 
machine acting the part of interviewer or asking the librarian for 
assistance in difficult cases; and a combination of the speed, 
accuracy and scope of the machine, with the expert judgement and 
experience of the librarian. 
Burns (1971, pp. 297-302) describes the "four s t eps or phases of 
a systems survey" which he labels "the systems analysis phase, the 
sys tems design phase, and the implementation/evaluation phase:" 
The systems effort begins with a problem defined by the ana -
lyst as a system existing in an environment of other system s and 
bound by certain constraints. The first step is to isol a te the 
system under revi ew so that it can be described in an unambiguous 
fashion. This is the systems survey stage and marks th e beginning 
of a series of successive partitionings which take place until the 
system has been divided into the smallest lo gica l component still 
capable of being identified with the system being studi ed . 
... After dividing the system into its molecular components, 
the analyst th en proc eeds to delineate the alternatives he has 
created by rearranging these component parts in whatever fashion 
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the resources and goals of the system will allow, always being 
careful to work within the constraints which the system ' s environ-
ment dictates. The anal y st then proceeds to evaluate these 
alternative solutions in the light of the stated goals or objec-
tives and selects from them a preferred course of action which he 
recommends to the decision-maker . 
... But how does all this apply in a library environment 
where the goal is that nebulus entity "service?" In order to 
answer this question realisticall y , one must first decide what 
constitutes the library's service goal. The author has chosen to 
adopt the definition of the librar y 's goal that Mackenzie has used: 
"to assist in the identification, provision a nd use of the document 
or piece of information that would best help the user in his 
study, teaching or research, at the optima l combination of cost 
and elapsed time. . .. "Efficiency, when used in this context, 
becomes either answering more of the "needs" of a reader while 
holding costs and elapsed time constant, or meeting the same 
needs while cutting down costs and elapsed time. 
In the first phase of the systems study, the analyst conducts 
what is called the systems survey, during which he relates the 
system under review to other systems in which it is embedded - to 
its environment if yo u will - by determining what is germane to 
the problem being studied. Once th e se boundaries have been estab-
lished, the analyst begins to lay out the problem in very general 
t e rms, specifying the goals and fun c tions of the system under 
review . 
... The analyst is now ready t o begin the second phase of 
his study, preparation of a block diagram or syst em sch ema tic, 
which outlines in a very genera l way the tasks performed by the 
system and the relationships which exist between the subsystems . 
... Construction of the block diagram and the flow charts 
are the first concrete expression of an analysis effort which 
up to now has been primarily a data gathering and intellectual 
exercise . 
... There still remains the difficult problem of evaluating 
intan g ibles - those factors which can not be quantified, such as 
convenience, availability, prestig e , etc. - and if the cost 
studies have been close, intangibles become crucial to the 
decision-making process . 
... The next phase, systems design, usually follows when 
the analysis effor t s have been completed and carefully digested. 
In theory, these steps should be discrete. In actual practice, 
however, they seldom are, for the decision efforts will often 
overlay the analysis studies . 
... The final phase begins with the implementation of the 
prototype system and its test/ evaluation . This is often the most 
expensive single phase and its success depends on all earlier 
phases being in a stat e of completion . 
... It is obvious that such work is a prerequisite to library 
automation, but it does not necessarily follow th at automation 
will automatically succeed the systems efforts. Indeed, the study 
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can easily indicate that library automation is not appropriate 
given the existing resources of time , money, staff, or space. In 
essence then, systems work is a method - part science, part art -
whereby one determines the correct balance between constraints and 
the resources necessary to realize predetermined goals, and leads 
to the establishment of realistic priorities based upon a thorough 
urrderstanding of the total system being studied and its relation-
ships to all other systems having a common interface. 
Avram (1970, p . 487) brings the concept of "s ystems design" as it 
relates to the computerizatiorr of library reference service in to focus 
when she states: "Th e problems facing the planners of automated library 
networks are rooted in the complexities of organizing and managing a 
vast flow of bibliographical in[or rnation and its interface with users.'' 
Costs 
Cost is presently a primary factor limiting the computerization of 
library reference service, and indeed th e computerization o[ all liurary 
functions. Garvin (1963, p. 284) believ e s that the cost of experi-
mental testin g is significant, particularly in the field of information 
retrieval. 
... Some of the experiments which are now underway are very 
valuable experime nts, very important experiments, very necessary 
experiments, but also very expensive experiments . The cost of 
getting literature into mechanized form for lan gua ge tr ans l a tion, 
or for running experiments in information retrieval, are substan-
tial. If any barrier really exists in the application of scien-
tific method to this field, it is probably this one. 
Shoffrier (1970, p. 450) summarizes some of the cost and size 
characteristics of library automation efforts: 
... the libraries: 1) they are small organizations (in rela-
tion to industry), 2) there are a large nu mber o[ them, 3) person-
nel constitutes the major cost (two-thirds) of library operations, 
4) taken together, libraries are a noticeable portion of the 
n ational economy (approximately 0.1 percent of th e GNP), and 5) 
libraries a r e growing . 
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Shoffner (1970, p. 451) is not optimistic about decreasing library 
expenditures: 
Over the fifteen-year period from 1951 to 1966, salary 
scales were increasing at the rate uf 4 Lo 5 percent per yea r. 
Be c ause of this, the cost per unit of library operation has risen 
a t the rate of 2.5 percent per year. So long as the technology 
of library operations remains the same, costs are likely to 
increase in this manner, even without changes in volume of opera -
tion. However, there are also changes in volume of operations as 
a result of increases in purchasing levels in response to increas-
ing publica r ion and increasing demand . The rate of publication 
is said to be doubling every fifteen years. Library patrons are 
placing an increasing level of dem a nd on libraries, and by the 
end of the century ther~ will be 100 million more people in the 
United States . The implications of this are enormous for libraries 
as well as for all public services . 
Continuin g this discussion, Shoffner (1970, p. 459) points ,;ut tha t 
"libraries are in a position in which the penal t ies for failure for b oth 
the library and the administrator are far greater than have been the 
possible rewards from the successful ap p l ication of computers to library 
operations ." He believes that federal funding is an important factor in 
simulating library automation bec a use it provides the development capital 
and thereby reduces the risk to the library. 
DeGennaro (1970, p. 539) outlines the cost factors involved in the 
development of an automated information retrieval system: 
. .. Input keyboarding is only on e of the costs and by no means 
the major one. Tagging the elemen t s and editing the copy require 
the greatest effort and are the most difficult to accomplish since 
they demand personnel with training and experie nc e in bibliographical 
work, and such persons are in extremely short supply . Computer and 
other machine costs are also sig ni ficant, as well as project direc-
ti on, administration, space, and other overhead costs . Another ma-
jor cate gory of expense which is f r equen tl y over loo ked or mis-
un derstood is th e very high cost of software development - systems 
design, programming a n d program maintenance. Expense is not th e 
only problem ; i t is difficult to find and hold th e hi ghly skilled 
persons who are needed to do this complex technical work. 
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DeGennaro (1970, p. 547) describes the cost factors involved in 
the RECON study conversion method: 
Applyin g the unit cost of the least expensive RECON Study 
conversion me thod, i.e., $1.51, and 386,000 English-language 
records in the record set from 1960 to March 1969 c ould be con-
verted for an estimated $581,000. The cost of converting the 
1,72 8 ,000 English-language records from 1898-1959 would be 
$2,602,000. To convert the estimated total of 2,114,000 English-
langua ge records would cost nearly $3,100,000. Since this is 
approximately half of the entire LC record set, the cost of con-
verting the whole set would be on the order of $7 million. 
The cost of systems design and software for a conversion 
system is estimated at $569,000 and is constant regardless of the 
number of records to be converted. The cost of hardware is based 
on the total number of records to be converted over a period of 
years and is therefore an extremely complex factor. However, 
for purposes of this discussion, the conversion, storage, and 
manipulation of the four million entries in the record set would 
requir e a tw o- shif t computer system costing an estimated $7 million 
over an eig ht- year period. This system would support more than mere 
conversion operations ; it would provide equipment for a national 
biblio graphical service. 
DeGennaro (1976, p. 177) describes t he Stanford system and what is 
being done t o reduce costs: 
the Stanford system, called BALLOTS, is a n online inter-
active system with multi-file and multi-index capabilities and 
using video display units in such a way as to allow for its exten-
sion, in phases from technical pro cess ing support to other areas 
of libr ary operations and eventually to serve as a central system 
for a library network. Although it has been supportin g the day-to-
day acquisitions and cataloging operations of the Stanford libraries 
since November 197 2, operational costs in this mode are excessively 
high and efforts are currently underway, as a result of a recent 
CLR grant, to make the expansions necessary to permit the system to 
support a large-scale network for California similar to OCLC . 
... Stanford is actively tryin g to promote BALLOTS as a node 
for a western library network and this is undoubtedly where its 
future lies. 
Parker (1969, p. 312) concludes that "it seems probable that co-
operation between libraries will provide the most effi c ient means of 
procuring the computer capacities required. Their similar problems can 
use the same programs and utilize the same peripheral equipment . Since 
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the data stored are of the same nature and much is common to many 
libraries, more economical use can be made of the mass storage devices ." 
National library system 
Parker (1969, p. 309) points out that libr a ry resource sharing is 
based upon two assumptions : "the first, that libraries are not alike; 
the second, that the holdings of any one library which are distinctive 
are likely t o be lesser used and therefore available for use by the 
clientele of the other co-operating institutions." 
Parker (1969, pp. 314-315) describes a national library system: 
Let us look for a moment at the schematic organization of such 
a bibliographic network. Ideally there would be a central data 
bank which would serve the entire area, whether it be a political 
unit or merely a convenient geographical one . At this highest 
level would exist standardized biblio g raphic descriptions of all 
materials held anywhere within the li mits of the system. Each 
record would be keyed to the region a l data bank or banks within 
the tot a l area which recorded the i t em. 
Re g ional bibliographic centers would be connected by trunk 
lines to the area data bank; in turn, each center would be con-
nected by terminal to each librar y participating in the system. 
There would be an auxiliary data bank for the re g ion, containin g 
the records of those bibliographic items owned by the partici-
pants. The direct on-line inquiries made from the individual 
library to the re g ional bibliographic center would be essentially 
of two types. The first would be related to the acquisition of 
materials, in which case the bibliographic da t a itself would be 
the most importan t element. Occasionally, knowledge of which 
library already owned the material would be of si gnificance in 
determining the desirabili t y of acquisition. The regional center 
would perform various services related to acquisition for the 
member libraries, including creation of purchase orders, account-
in g work related to them, preparationof new book lists, special 
indexes, and the like. 
In either kind of situation, if the item desired were not 
within the regional center there would be an automatic switching 
to the central data bank. If acquisition is th e object of the 
inquiry, the process can stop at this point. If the object is 
interlibrary loan the central computer would transfer the inquiry 
t o the regional center closest to the requisitioning library. The 
process would then lead to a message to the library owning the book, 
requesting its loan or transmission of a fascimile image. 
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The great rewards of cooperation are becoming feasible 
technologically as a result of developments in computers and in 
communication. They will be realized only with interlibrary 
cooperation on a scale not yet experienced, cooperation which must 
bridge language, nationality and the seven seas. 
Parker (1969, p. 312) cautions, however, that "under the 
pressure of absolute conformity, if there is to be cooperative use of 
computers, standardization which has appeared to be an unattainable 
ideal becomes an absolute necessity." Avram (1970, p. 491) concludes 
that "the dominant purpose of standardization of the bibliographic record 
and the provision of means of rapid communication is to facilitate the 
pooling of bibliographic information. If these conditions are met, the 
amount of information in the network will tend to equal the sum of the 
information in all of the individual libraries." 
Summary 
Katz (1969) contends that a referen c e interview situation exists 
where a library patron is not certain wha t he wants or where there is a 
problem as to exactly what kind of information he needs. A computer-
based information retrieval system just like a reference librarian must 
constantly be driving to clarify the question and to match it with an 
information source. Katz (1969) presents some of the steps a reference 
librarian and indeed an artificial intelligence system must follow to 
clarify a reference question. These steps are: purpose, scope, time, 
key words, subject, need for "bridge," form, language, and availability 
of materials. 
Meredith (1971) describes REFSEARCH as a machine-assisted approach 
system which attempts to bring the library patron to a position from 
which he can take the final step to retrieving the information he is 
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seeking. REFSEARCH is based on the assumption that every reference 
question has a "handle" or specific noun central to the sense of the 
question and indexable somewhere in the general reference collection. 
It translates the handle to some category that fits the notion of the 
kinds of things indexes are about. 
The Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) employs the 
Boolean search technique to sort out only those citations which satisfy 
the needs of a particular research problem. The Boolean search tech-
nique is important to us as an example of a computer program which sorts 
"sets" of information on a given subject and then combines these sets 
to retrieve relevant publication citations . 
Henley (1970) is convinced that user- o rientation or op e nness to his 
needs must receive high priority in the design of a computerized infor-
mation retrieval system. Three separate r e quirements may be discussed 
which are connected with thr ee different types of library user. These 
requirements are: browsin g , information retrieval, and re gu lar notifi-
cation. 
Shera (1972) cites Harold Borko in describing information sci ence 
as a true discipline. Shera (1972) goes on to maintain that information 
science is also interdisciplinary in that it derives from and relates 
to such fields as mathematics, logic, linguistics, psychology, computer 
technology, operations research, the graphic arts, library science, 
management, and similar fields. 
Linderman (1967, p. 177) believes that "an important current 
development for the future of reference work has been the introduction 
of systems thinking into library procedures work." Burns (1971, pp. 
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297-302) describes the four steps or phases of a systems survey which 
he labels "the systems analysis phas e , the systems design phase, and 
the implementation/evaluation phase." Avram (1970) feels that the 
importanc e of systems design for the computerization of reference 
service is understood when we realize that the problems facing the 
planners of automated library networks are rooted in the complexities 
of organizing and managing a vast flow of bibliographic information and 
its interface with users. 
Cost is presently a primary factor limiting the computerization of 
library reference service, and indeed the computerization of all 
library functions. Shoffner (1970, p. 459) points out that "libraries 
are in a position in which the pen al t ie s for failure for both the 
library and the administrator are far greater than have been the pos-
sible rewards from the successful application of computers t o library 
operations." He believes th a t federal fun d in g is an important factor 
in stimulating library automation because it provides the development 
capital and thereby reduces the risk to the library. 
Parker (1969 concludes that "cooperation between libraries will 
provide the most effective means of procuring the computer capacities 
required. Libraries with similar problems can use the same programs 
and utilize the same peripheral equipment. Since the data to be stored 
are of the same nature and much is common to many libraries, more 
economical use can be made of the mass stora ge devices." 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE FUTURE OF REFERENCE SERVICE 
Weber (1971, p. 33) believes that "the librarian who carries the 
responsibility for major mechanized data processing programs will pro-
bably have taken at least half a dozen courses in various aspe c ts of 
data processin g in order to be able to state reasonable requirements, 
to comprehend economic and technical limitations, discuss file organ-
ization problems with the systems designer, and be sufficiently in-
formed to help explain the new system to the library staff that will 
operate or make use of it." 
Linderman (1967, p. 151) points out that "library reference 
work demands a hi gh order of intellectual ac tivity, and its subtleties 
have thus far proved too elusive for comput e r programming. I say 'thus 
far,' because I believe the time will come when some in gen ious person 
will supply the missing algorithm that will make machines as vital to 
the support of the reference function as they already are to technical 
processing." Linderman (1967, p. 7) concludes that "already there is 
writing on the wall. (It is actually the trace of a light-pen on the 
face of a cathode-ray tube). What the writing says is, 'You are now on-
line to the national reference system.'" 
Warheit (1970, p. 74) comments that mechanization will affect all 
operations of the library: 
Suffice it to say that an increasing number of librarians 
are becoming convinced that library mechanization is inevitable, 
that it will affect all operations of the library, that it will 
provide the highest level of service through direct, on-line inter-
active systems and that, whatever today's limitations may be, 
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these changes are coming so fast that plans must be made now. 
These individuals are also convinced that whatever is now under-
taken in the way of mechanization will evolve into an integrated 
system with many basic functions operated in a real-time, on-line 
mode. 
DeGennaro (1976) views the 1960's as an era when library auto-
mation was primarily localized. He views the 1970's, however, as an 
era characterized by library membership in computer networks such as 
OCLC. He contends that a highly qualified in-house technical staff 
is less essential now as librarians become more familiar with package 
systems such as OCLC. DeGennaro (1976, p. 183) further comments that 
we have seen the main thrust of library automation evolve 
from building total or integrated systems for individual libraries 
using local systems staff and equipment, to building regional 
library networks using the systems, facilities, and staffs of a 
few major centers such as the Library of Congress, New York Public 
Library, OCLC, Chicago, and Stanford. We have also seen the paral-
lel emergence of a new concept at Minnesota, namely the develop-
ment of a powerful, flexible, and inexpensive mini-computer system 
for use in a single l ibrary. If this concep t proves itself, it 
could combine some o f the best features of the total systems 
goal of the 1950's with the major success of the 1970's - the 
cooperative network. This marriage could produce Hhat may become 
the dominant thrust of the 1980's - the development of cost-
effective in-house library mini-computer processing and catalog 
access systems capable of interfacing synergistically with an 
effective national library network for sharing bibliographical 
data and library resources. 
Shera (1969, p. 2280) quotes Kenneth Boulding: 
"We see this ... in what may be the most serious social by-
product of automation, a loss of self-respect and 'manhood' on 
the part of those whose skills are being displaced. The g reat est 
human tragedy is to feel useless and not wanted, and with the rise 
in the intelligence of machines, we may face a period in which the 
human race divides into two parts, those who feel themselves to be 
more intelligent than machines and those who feel themselves to be 
less . . . . 
... The educational system is pe c uliarly specialized in the 
production of people, and it must never lose sight of the fact that 
it is producing people as ends, not as means. It is producing men, 
not manpower, people not biologically generated nonlinear com-
puters. 
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Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963, p. 19) bring us back to one of our 
original questions when they state: 
... "Can machines think?" I believe to be too meaningless 
to deserve discussion. Nevertheless, I believe that a t the end 
of the ce ntury the use of words and general educated opinion will 
have altered so much th a t one will be able to speak of machines 
thinking without expecting to be contradicted. I believe further 
that no useful purpose is served by concealing these beliefs. 
The popular view that scientists proceed inexorably from well-
established fact, never being influenced by a n y improved conjec-
ture, is quite mistaken. Provided it is made clear which are 
proved facts and which are conjectures, no harm can result. 
Conjectures are of grea t importance since they suggest useful lines 
of research. 
Summary 
Weber (1971, p. 33) believes that "the librarian who carries the 
responsibility for major mechanized data processing programs will have 
taken at lea s t half a dozen courses in various aspects of data pro-
cessing. Linderman (1967, p. 151) point s out that library reference 
work demands a high order of intellectual activity, and its subtleties 
have thus far proved too elusive for computer pro gramming." But, he 
feels that the time will come when the missing algorithm will be 
supplied that will make machines as vital to the support of reference 
service as they already are to technical processing. 
DeGennaro (1976) believes that the 1970's will be an era character-
ized by library membership in computer networks such as OCLC. He con-
tends that the result will be a highl y qualified in-house technical 
staff supplemented and even replaced by librarians more familiar with 
"package" computer systems. 
Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963, p. 19) present the question, "Can 
machines think?" This is a question which should be left open; for 
research is movin g in a direction which seems to indicate that the 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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Based on an analysis of the literature, the following conclusions 
are made re gar din g the feasibility of a computer-based librar y reference 
interview. 
1. The development of computer hardware and software has not 
reached adequate advancement for the realization of a computer-
based library reference interview. 
2. A deeper understanding of human communication will be required 
to support th e feasibility of a computer-based library reference 
interview. 
3. Research for the adva ncement of computer t echnology and a deepe r 
und ers t andi n g of human communication is progressing in a direc-
tion which indicates that the realization of a computer-based 
library reference intervi ew will be feasible in the near future. 
4. It follows that librarians in the near future will need computer 
trainin g to cope with impending library automation. 
5. The information explosion presently demands the advancement of 
computer technology to support the feasibility of a computer-
based library reference interview. 
6. Cost is a primary factor limiting the feasibility of a computer-
based library reference interview. 
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7. The advancement of computer technology together with the 
realization of a national library system and Federal funding 
will reduce the cost factor which is preventing the realiza-
tion of a computer-based library reference interview. 
8. A computer-based library reference interview will be entirely 
objective, reserving the subjective aspect of intelligence 
to man alone . 
Recommendations 
Based on an analysis of the literature and the foregoing conclu-
sions, it is recommended that: 
1. Librarians begin acquirin g a working knowledge of the machinery 
presently available for automating library reference service. 
2. Librarians investigate all aspe c ts of communication invol ve d 
in a library reference interview for deeper understanding and 
ultimate supp o rt of th e automation of library reference service. 
3. Librarians become familiar with systems analysis and design to 
reduce error in determining their particular au tomation needs. 
4. Libr aria ns tak e steps to acquire Federal support for funding 
th e automation of library reference service. 
5. Librarians standardize all aspects of library operations, there-
by making a n ationa l librar y network possible, e liminating the 
duplication of effort, and ultimately reducing the cost of 
automated reference service. 
6. Librarians begin learning their role as a subjective interface 
between library patrons and the objective or totally logical 
machinery which will automate reference service. 
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7. Librarians become "information scientists" acquiring empirical 
data for better understanding and ultimate realization of a 
computer-based library reference interview. 
8. Cha os be reduced in the national information network through 
the realization of a computer-based reference service. 
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